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THE SUPERIOR POSITION OF THE CREDITOR
IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY REGIME: HAS
THE COMMUNITY BECOME A MERE CREDITOR
COLLECTION DEVICE?
Andrea B. Carroll*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The community property regime has been lauded as one
of the most beautiful and significant achievements of the civil
law tradition.1 It is widely accepted as the marital property
regime of choice for an astonishing number of countries,
including France, Germany, Spain, Brazil, and countless
others.2 Even on American soil, where the common law
tradition is generally favored over that of the civil law, the
community regime has gained significant sway. Nine of our
states have rejected the English-inspired marital property
regime in favor of the community property structure.' The
* C.E. Laborde, Jr. Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul
M. Hebert Law Center. I thank William Corbett, Jason Kilborn, and Katherine
Spaht for helpfil discussions on earlier drafts of this Article, as well as the LSU
Law Center for its generous research support. Kati Cox (LSU Law Center Class
of 2006) provided excellent research assistance.
1. See Harriett S. Daggett, Policy Questions on Marital Property Law in
Louisiana,in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 50, 52 (Jan

P. Charmatz & Harriett S. Daggett eds., 1977).
2. See Richard L. Conner, Brazilian Marital Property: The Dwindling
Community, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 705, 705 (1975); Terrance J. Mullin, Column,
Understandingthe Testamentary Effects of Community Property Rules, 79 FLA.
BARJ. 49, 49 n.1 (2005).
3. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington have long been community property states. J. Mark Weiss,
Community Property Interests in Separate Property Businesses in Washington,
40 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004) (citing Nathan R.

Long, Community

Characterizationof the Increased Value of Separately Owned Businesses, 32
IDAHO L. REV. 760, 759-61, 765 (1996)); see also Angela M. Bradstreet, Marital

Property Law in England and California:A Comparative Study and Critique, 4
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 143 (1980). Wisconsin became the last
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result is a marital property scheme in a minority of states not
quite understood by the masses,4 but nonetheless admired for
its ancient and bold advancements in the area of spousal
equality and women's rights.5
In the centuries since its adoption in the American
community property states, the regime has made significant
innovations necessary to retain its suitability in the modern
world.6 Some of these "noble experiments,"7 however, have
morphed the community property regime into something
unintended at its inception and somewhat disturbing today.
Created for the purpose of preserving and furthering
familial interests,8 the community as it currently exists in
this country seems to have wandered astray. One scholar's
analysis of twentieth-century modifications to the regime
even led him to remark that the modern community property
regime promotes "the ultimate welfare of no one except those
parasites who live on litigation-breeding rules of law."9 On
the contrary, there is one party-aside from lawyers, of
course-whose welfare today's community property regime
clearly and exceptionally promotes: the creditor.
Creditor protection may be a worthy societal goal, at
least generally speaking. But the community regime has
gone so far to provide such protection that it has significantly
departed from its teleology. The family's interest is neither
furthered nor preserved by the surprisingly broad access to
property granted to all sorts of creditors of spouses residing in
community property states. And the family is not the only

American state to adopt a marital property regime that is considered
'community" with its enactment of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act-heavily
based on the Uniform Marital Property Act-in 1986. See Howard S. Erlanger
& June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property:
Wisconsin's MaritalProperty Act Four Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 769, 76971 (1990).
4. See W. S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 6 (1982).

5. M. R. Kirkwood, Historical Background and Objectives of the Law of
Community Property in the Pacific Coast States, 11 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 1,
11 (1936); GEORGE McKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

§§ 70-74, at 64-67 (2d ed. 1925).
6. Daggett, supra note 1, at 52.
7. Richard R. B. Powell, Community Property-A Critique of Its Regulation
of Intra-Family Relations, 11 WASH L. REV. & ST. B. J. 12, 34 (1936).
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. Powell, supra note 7, at 38.
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victim of this expansion of creditors' rights. The consistency
and utility of marital property laws are threatened by a
system that deviates from the fundamental principles behind
debt collection and favors spouses' creditors.
This article will begin by demonstrating just how
creditor-friendly the community property regime has become.
Part II will analyze the rights afforded spousal creditors in
the various community property states, comparing them to
each other and to their non-community property peers.1 ° The
section will then discuss, among other things, the unique
ability of a creditor in a community property state to seize the
property of a person with no connection to a debt-only the
misfortune of having married the debtor-both for obligations
incurred during marriage and for antenuptial obligations.1
These rules of creditor collection, when paired with the
community property states' generally acerbic rules regarding
spousal ability to contract around the onerous rules of debt
collection, show the significant protection afforded creditors
in the community regime. Part III will suggest that the
When
regime has indeed become too creditor-oriented.
examined in light of the policies behind the regime's
promulgation and the regime's reluctance to address the
expectations and needs of the spouses and their sophisticated
creditors, it will become obvious that the community regime
has simply gone too far in placing the rights of creditors
above those of the spouses.' 2 The reader will certainly be left
to wonder whether the community property regime today
serves merely as a creditor collection device.
II. THE EXCEPTIONAL CREDITOR BENT OF THE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY REGIME

Modern creditors in community property regimes have
access to a mass of spousal property almost inconceivable in
non-community property states. Of course, they may access
their debtor's property. But much more may be available as
3
well.'
10. See discussion supra Part II.A.
11. See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
12. See discussion supra Part III.
13. This article analyzes the creditor collection rules in the nine community
property states with a rule-rather than jurisdiction-method of organization in
an effort to demonstrate the regimes' significant preference for creditors. Of
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A. Preventing the "$2 Bankruptcy": CreditorRights to
Community Property for PremaritalDebts
One not well-versed in the intricacies of the community
property regime will likely find the protection afforded
antenuptial creditors of the spouses among its most shocking
features. It is axiomatic in non-community property statessometimes referred to as "common law states" 14 -that a
creditor's collection efforts must be directed solely toward his
debtor's property. 15 When a debtor in a common law state6
marries, the creditor's ability to collect remains unaffected.1
The mere fact of marriage neither hurts nor helps a thirdparty creditor, who may continue to seize any property owned
by the debtor spouse." But this is not so in the community
property regime. A great windfall comes to the creditor
whose struggling debtor marries an employed person in a
That creditor's rights are
community property state.'"
substantially expanded by the marriage alone.' 9
While some states now limit creditor access to community
property for the antenuptial debts of the spouses,2 ° several
still provide surprisingly expansive creditor protection.
Louisiana's community property regime is by far the most
creditor-friendly on this front. It allows the premarital
creditor of a spouse for all manner of debts access to the

course, when any individual community property regime is considered alone, its
own internal rules may diverge in terms of whether they grant the creditor or
the spouses more protection. Nevada, for instance, takes a stand exceptionally
favorable to creditors with regard to the enforcement of matrimonial
agreements, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1979) (sanctioning separate

property agreements between spouses), but is less creditor-friendly with regard
to antenuptial debts. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.050 (1975) (limiting creditor
access to community property for the antenuptial debts of spouses).
14. See, e.g., MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 1:1, at 3.
15. Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage Into
Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code
and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 526
n.177 (2000).
16. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 10:1, at 478.
17. Id.
18. See id. § 10:1, at 479.
19. See id.
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215(B) (2000) (only value of debtor spouse's
contribution to the community property may be seized for his premarital debts);
see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2004) (non-debtor spouse's
share of community property not seizable for other's debts contracted before
marriage).
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entirety of the community property, including the community
property interests of the debtor and non-debtor spouses
alike.21 Other American community property jurisdictions go
almost as far. Idaho has at least suggested that seizure of
any and all community property is appropriate for the
satisfaction of a premarital debt 2 and California has
legislatively recognized an antenuptial creditor's ability to
seize the entirety of the spouses' community property, save
any earnings of the non-debtor spouse that are isolated in a
distinct account.
The history behind Louisiana's move toward full
community liability for premarital debts is indeed interesting.
The Louisiana Supreme Court first provided for this
unprecedented access to all community property for
premarital debts at a time when state legislation arguably
prohibited such access.
The Louisiana Civil Code, from its inception in the year
1808,24 provided in article 2403 that "the debts of both
husband and wife, anterior to the marriage, must be

21. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (1985).

22. In Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 69 P.3d 173 (Idaho Ct. App.
2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered whether the wages of the
husband-debtor were properly garnished for his premarital debt (a debt
incurred with his first wife). Finding no legislation and few cases on point, the
court held the garnishment proper. Id. at 178. To support its decision, the
Idaho court cited an early twentieth-century case in which the Idaho Supreme
Court even allowed seizure of community real property for a husband's
antenuptial debt. Id. at 177. The modern approval of that case suggests that
Idaho may sanction seizure of all community property, and not just the debtor
spouse's earnings. The court did not address this question, however, as it was
not at issue in Action Collection Service, in which the creditor sought only a
wage garnishment. Future decisions will have to determine whether Idaho will
take its creditor protection policies as far as Louisiana has.
23. CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2004); see also Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin.

Servs., Inc., 925 P.2d 1002 (Cal. 1996). Of course, the exemption of non-debtor
earnings is a substantial restriction on the creditor. But the availability of
other community property, such as community real estate or any other
,acquisition," aligns California more with Louisiana than with other community
property states providing more limited access.
24. The 1808 version of Louisiana's written law was actually not a "Code,"
properly so called, at all, but rather a "Digest," or compilation of incomplete
rules. By 1825, however, the Digest was replaced with a more or less "true
Code." See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative
Essay, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 383-89 (2003). Inany event, a provision identical to
Article 2403 persisted from 1808 until the revision of Louisiana's matrimonial
regimes rules more than 150 years later.
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acquitted out of their own personal and individual effects. 2' 5
Article 2403 was drawn from Spanish sources,2 6 including
legislation providing that "each spouse has the obligation to
satisfy from his separate assets his own (or non-community)
debts which he contracted before marriage."2 7 The plain
language of both the Louisiana enactment and its Spanish
source provision certainly seemed to indicate that only the
separate property of each spouse could be seized by a creditor
for a debt pre-dating the debtor's marriage. Such a result
appears logical and just, insofar as premarital debts
necessarily have no connection to the community.
The
satisfaction of these debts, under the Louisiana and Spanish
statutes, appeared to be limited to property with which the
debts were connected-namely, the separate property of the
debtor spouse-leaving the spouses' community property free
for seizure by community creditors.
Nevertheless, in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Civil
Code article 2403 and held that the entirety of the community
property between husband and wife-including real and
movable property-could be seized to satisfy the husband's
premarital debt.2" The court acknowledged that the plain
language of article 2403 suggested otherwise, but found the
article to provide a rule of allocation between the spouses and
not one binding on third-party creditors.29 In the court's view,
both the Louisiana legislative enactment and its Spanish
predecessor "anticipated the personal obligations of the
spouses to each other and did not attempt to fix the
responsibilities of the community in relation to third
parties." 0 In other words, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that article 2403 did not preclude creditors of a spouse from
seizing both community property and separate property for

25. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2403, 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL
CODES OF LOUISIANA (Joseph Dainow, ed.).

26. See Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. 1973); see also
Leonard Oppenheim, The Significance of Recent Louisiana Legislation
Concerning the Marital Community-Louisiana Acts 49 and 286 of 1944, 19
TuL. L. REV. 200, 204-05 (1944).
27. Creech, 287 So. 2d at 505.
28. Id. at 499.
29. Id. at 507.
30. Id.
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an obligation incurred before marriage.3 '
The court's interpretation of the Louisiana and Spanish
authorities in Creech was flawed in that it failed to appreciate
the scope of the application of the community property regime
in Louisiana. The Louisiana Civil Code articulates rules of a
community property regime which apply both as between the
spouses themselves and as between the spouses and third
parties such as creditors.3 2 Thus, in the absence of any
specific provision to the contrary, Louisiana Civil Code article
2403 should have been interpreted to provide a rule of
conduct governing both the spouses and third parties. Even
creditors, under a proper interpretation of Louisiana
legislation, should be limited to the debtor's separate property
for debts incurred before the establishment of the community
property regime.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's mistake of interpretation
in Creech is a rather moot one now, however. Five years after
the Creech decision was rendered, Louisiana undertook a
complete revision of its matrimonial regimes law. 33 Article
2403 was suppressed and a new law was established in its
place. 34 The new "equivalent" to article 2403 is Louisiana
Civil Code article 2345, which has remained unchanged since
1979 and provides that "[a] separate or community obligation
may be satisfied during the community property regime from
community property and from the separate property of the
spouse who incurred the obligation." 35 Although the new
legislation does not expressly address premarital debts, the
Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that the rule
applies to allow seizure of 100% of the community property
for both ante- and post-nuptial debts. 6
Historical materials surrounding the enactment of

31. Id.
32. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2325 (1985).

33. Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited:
1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L.
REV. 83, 83 (1979).
34. See id. at 85-88.
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (1985).
36. Rayne State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fruge, 546 So. 2d 637, 640 (La. Ct.
App. 1989) (entirety of community property seizable for guaranty agreements
wife signed during marriage without husband's knowledge); see also Bagwell v.
Bagwell, 698 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding entirety of community
property seizable for wife's premarital support obligation).

8
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2345 reveal little about the
purpose or motives of the legislature in approving the result
in Creech and continuing to allow creditors full access to
community property for premarital debts.
But other
community property states' struggles with the same problem
provide some insight. Most state laws allowing access to all
or some community property for a spouse's premarital debts
38
are a direct reaction to the so-called "marital bankruptcy."
Early in the history of the American community property
regime, following the Spanish model, 39 most states rejected
the liability of any community property whatsoever for
premarital debts.4 ° As the United States economy became
more creditor-focused, though, concern grew over the idea
that the debtor's marriage often frustrated the separate
creditor's attempt to collect a debt." If community property
could not be seized for premarital debts, and virtually all
property acquired after marriage, including the earnings of
both spouses, became community property,4 2 the creditor's
ability to rely on his debtor's earning stream to satisfy the
debt would all but evaporate. A debtor marrying into a
community property regime under these old rules of creditor
collection basically limited his creditor to attempting to

37. Unfortunately, the legislative debates surrounding the 1979
matrimonial regimes revision in Louisiana have not been preserved.
38. See, e.g., Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Seele, 69 P.3d 173, 178 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2003); see also Haley v. Highland, 960 P.2d 962, 964 (Wash. Ct. App.
1998) (stating that "[tihe legislature was creating an exception to the judiciallycreated rule of marital bankruptcy" when it began to allow access to community
property for premarital debts in 1969).
39. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 372 (2d ed. 1971).

40. See id. at 374-78 ("Properly, one spouse's half share in the community
property is just as much the spouse's property as is the spouse's separate
property, and should not therefore be liable for the other spouse's antenuptial
debts and obligations.").
41. Recent Developments, Community Property-Antenuptial DebtsEliminating Immunity of Earnings and Accumulations of Debtor SpouseR.C.W. 26.16.200 as Amended by Ch. 121, Laws of 1969, 1st Extraordinary
Session, 45 WASH. L. REV. 191, 192 (1970).

42. See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, Acts 1990, No. 1009: The Repeal of Provisions
for Separationfrom Bed and Board Increases the FederalIncome Tax Burden of
Separated Spouses in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 597, 603-04 (1993); see also
Melancon v. Melancon, 928 So. 2d 10, 14-15 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Norwest Fin. v.
Lawyer, 849 P.2d 324, 326 (Nev. 1993); In re Marriage of Marzetta, 120 P.3d 75,
80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Park Bank-West v. Mueller, 444 N.W.2d 754, 759
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
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collect from the property the debtor took into the marriage.
The debtor spouse's future earnings would be immune from
the day of the marriage forward. The problem was dubbed
the "marital bankruptcy" or the "$2 bankruptcy," as debtors
were said to be able to effectively shield themselves from
liability to their creditors merely by obtaining a $2 marriage
license.4 3
It is the possibility of this inequitable marital
bankruptcy, and the Hobson's choice between it and a
windfall to the creditor arising solely from his debtor's
marriage, that likely led states such as Idaho, Louisiana, and
California to begin allowing the seizure of some community
property for premarital debts.' The question now, however,
If
is whether those legislatures have overcorrected.
Louisiana's rule allowing full access to community property,
for instance, is an attempt to prevent the "$2 bankruptcy,"
has it gone too far? The potential prejudice to a creditor
caused by his debtor's marriage could be eliminated in any
number of ways that do not involve allowing a creditor to
seize all of the spouses' community property and that are
likewise more protective of the community. It is, perhaps, a
function of the modern legislative process-in which creditors'
lobbies abound-that the most creditor-friendly of all
45
solutions was chosen.
B. Uniting the Spouses in Holy Debt: Seizure of Community
Propertyfor Debts Incurred DuringMarriage
Perhaps the most commonly litigated question
surrounding debt collection from spouses is that of
determining what property is available to creditors for debts
incurred by just one of the spouses during the existence of the
community regime. To conveniently answer this question, all
nine of the American community property states are typically

43. See e.g., Hines v. Hines, 707 P.2d 969, 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985);
Schilling v. Embree, 575 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
44. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under
California's Community Property Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34
HASTINGS L. J. 227, 247-48 (1982).
45. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571,
590 & n.114 (2005) (describing the activities of a number of "well-funded
creditor lobbying groups").

10
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categorized into one of two systems-the "managerial system"
or the "community debt system." The labels seem convenient,
but in truth they are inaccurate. California and Louisiana do
not appropriately fall under either system, though they are
usually classified as managerial system states.4 6 But even
more significantly, the choice of one system or the other really
does little to change the treatment of creditors. Under both
systems, creditors-albeit through the use of different
mechanisms-have virtually unfettered discretion to seize a
wide variety of property, including nearly all of the spouses'
community property."
46. See, e.g., Eric L. Olsen, How Can a CreditorReach the Separate Property
of a Non-Debtor Spouse? Smith v. Dalton, 795 P.2d 706 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990),
28 IDAHO L. REV. 1100, 1100 n.1 (1992); William A. Reppy, Jr., Debt Collection
from Married Californians:Problems Caused by Transmutations,Single-Spouse
Management, and Invalid Marriage,18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 143, 168 (1980).

47. In addition to the significant substantive advantages afforded to
creditors, the community property regime offers at least one stunning
procedural advantage. The vast majority of the community property states do
not require the joinder of the non-debtor spouse for a creditor to enforce a
judgment against the community property. In effect, the entirety of the
community property of the spouses, including the non-debtor spouse's one-half
interest in that community property, may be seized though the non-debtor
spouse is afforded no opportunity to object or to dispute the underlying debt.
Only two states, Idaho and Washington, have plainly required the
joinder of the non-debtor spouse and they have so held only in the context of
community real property. See, e.g., Willes v. Palmer, 298 P.2d 972, 974-75
(Idaho 1956); Northwest Bridge Co. v. Tacoma Shipbuilding Co., 78 P. 996, 997
(Wash. 1904). Washington has overtly rejected the requirement of joinder
where immovable property is not sought to be seized. See, e.g., Oil Heat Co. of
Port Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 613 P.2d 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
Arizona statutes appear to require joinder of both spouses for seizure of
any community property. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.. § 25-215(D) (1973). But case
law interprets the statute as one making the non-debtor spouse a necessary,
rather than indispensable, party. See Flexmaster Aluminum Awning Co. v.
Hirschberg, 839 P.2d 1128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
What is even more shocking, though, is that some community property
states not only do not require joinder of the non-debtor spouse before her
interest in the community property is seized, but do not even require the nondebtor spouse to receive notice of the pending action. See Robert D. Williams,
Recent Developments, When Must a Creditor, in an Action to Satisfy an
Obligation from Community Property, Join Both Spouses? Flexmaster
Aluminum Awning Co. v. Hirschberg, 839 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992),
29 IDAHO L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1992-1993); see also Yearout v. Am. Pipe & Steel
Corp., 168 P.2d 174, 176 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946); Cutting v. Bryan, 274 P.
326, 327 (Cal. 1929); Randono v. Turk, 466 P.2d 218 (Nev. 1970); Jemko, Inc. v.
Liaghat, 738 P.2d 922, 926 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Bank One, Appleton, NA v.
Reynolds, 500 N.W.2d 337, 338 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
The problem is most disturbing in the context of garnishment of the
non-debtor spouse's wages. Wisconsin has maintained its non-joinder and non-
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1.

Hinging CreditorAccess on Spousal Control-The
ManagerialSystem
Today, five community property states-California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas-are commonly
categorized under the managerial system of liability. 48 The
thrust of the managerial system sanctioned by these states is
that any community property the debtor spouse has the right
to manage may be seized by his creditor to satisfy a debt
incurred during marriage.4 9 Underlying this rule is the
simple notion that any property a debtor has the right to
alienate voluntarily to his creditor should also be seizable by
that creditor in the absence of debtor consent.5 0 The rule was
designed to prevent a spouse with few or no separate assets
from incurring an obligation during marriage, only to have
the debt become essentially uncollectible. 1 Giving creditors
access to some community property-that portion of it that

notice rule to find that a wife's wages may be garnished for a debt incurred
solely by her husband even where she was not a defendant in or given notice of
the underlying action on her husband's debt. See, e.g., Bank One, 500 N.W.2d
at 337.
Louisiana jurisprudence has recently begun to hold that due process
requires at least notice of the impending execution for garnishment of the nondebtor spouse's wages, though notice of the underlying suit is still not required.
Compare Jackson v. Galan, 631 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1986) and Rayne State
Bank & Trust Co. v. Fruge, 546 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1989) with Shel-Boze,
Inc. v. Melton, 509 So. 2d 106 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
The theory behind a non-joinder or non-notice rule is that "during
marriage the defendant spouse will guard the community interest and give the
other spouse whatever notification of the lawsuit he or she should have."
WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 449 (6th ed. 2004). However sound in the abstract, the rule just

further clears the way for the creditor. He may assert his rights to all of the
community property without even the bother of the joinder of or notice to the
non-debtor spouse.
48. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426; Elizabeth De Armond, It
Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community
Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 274 (1995).
Idaho case law is
contradictory. The state's courts adopted a managerial approach as early as
1919, but have inexplicably, and perhaps even unintentionally, applied a
community debt theory in a few recent cases. See Erik Paul Smith, Comment,
The Uncertainty of Community Propertyfor the Tortious Liabilities of One of the
Spouses: Where the Law Is Uncertain, There Is No Law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 799,
817-23 (1994).

49. De Armond, supra note 48, at 274.
50. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426; see also Smith, supra note
48, at 810.
51. Smith, supra note 48, at 810.
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the debtor spouse could voluntarily alienate-promised to
alleviate such an inequitable result.
Unfortunately, because of the still inequitable and maledominated nature of the community property management
scheme at the time the managerial system was developed, it
could not at first meet this lofty goal. The managerial system
for determining the extent of debtor liability was first
developed when husbands were the so-called "head and
master" of the spousal community in all community property
states.5 2 Under the head and master management scheme,
husband alone could act to obligate the spouses' community
property, either voluntarily or involuntarily.5 3
Problems with the managerial system, as applied to the
then-existing community property regime, quickly became
apparent. The most significant issue arose when the wife
incurred debts, particularly through her tortious actions.
Since the wife had no rights of management in the
community property under the head and master scheme,
none of the community property could be seized to satisfy her
debts.5 4 If the wife had no separate property, the managerial
system's aim of eliminating the inequities to the creditor was
rendered ineffective. Again, the creditor would go unpaid,
even if the spouses had a great deal of community property in
their possession.
With the late twentieth-century abolition of the head and
master scheme in all nine community property states 55 and
the move toward a gender-neutral management scheme, the
managerial system for debt collection necessarily changed
dramatically as well. In theory, it now allows a creditor to
seize, either for contractual or tortious debts, any property
the new gender-neutral management scheme places within

52. See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 75, 125 (2004).

53. Under this system, then, all of the community property could be held for
the acts of a husband, as he managed it all. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last
One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law from the Regulation of

Marriage,63 LA. L. REV. 243, 290 (2003); see also Oppenheim, supra note 26, at
200-202 (1944) (discussing the history of the husband as head and master of the
community property with control over the administration of all marital
property).
54. Spaht, supra note 53, at 290.
55. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 345; Frantz & Dagan, supra

note 52, at 125.
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the control of the debtor spouse.
Community property
managed exclusively by the non-debtor spouse, or that
managed by the spouses jointly, and the separate property of
the non-debtor spouse would be immune from seizure in a
jurisdiction adhering to a "pure" managerial system.
The most distinctive feature of the managerial system is
that it views the purpose of the debt incurred as wholly
irrelevant to creditors' rights. The rule allowing creditors to
seize the community property managed by the debtor spouse
applies whether the debt is in the interest of or brings benefit
to the debtor's family, or is wholly self-interested, and indeed,
may even undermine the household unit.
In Lezine v.
Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc., for instance, the
husband forged and then falsely notarized his wife's
signature on a quitclaim deed to the family home.56 With the
forged deed in hand, husband borrowed $240,000 from a local
savings and loan and mortgaged the marital residence as
security. Wife had no knowledge of either the forged deed or
the loan. And more importantly, husband used the loan
proceeds for his own selfish purposes, bringing no benefit to
the community."
Nevertheless, the California Supreme
Court held the community property-including wife's interest
in it-seizable for husband's fraudulent debt under a
managerial system theory. 8
Although California and Louisiana are often said to
follow the managerial system,5 9 the label does not
appropriately describe the property available to creditors in
those states. A strict managerial system would allow a
creditor, for a debt incurred during marriage, to seize only the
community property managed by the debtor spouse. °
However, California and Louisiana, by statute, substantially
broaden creditor access to reach all community property,
including that portion of the community property managed
jointly, and even that managed exclusively by the non-debtor
spouse.61 The result of these legislative pronouncements is

56. Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 925 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Cal. 1996).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1006-07.
59. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426; De Armond, supra note 48, at

274.
60. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426.
61. CAL. FAm. CODE § 910(a) (West 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345,
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that these states truly cannot be described as falling within
the managerial system; management of community property
here has no bearing on creditors' rights. But the states are
nonetheless grouped with Idaho, Nevada, and Texas under
the managerial umbrella to make it abundantly clear that
they do not premise creditor access to community property on
a finding that the debt at issue is in the interest of the family
or somehow imparts a benefit to the community. 62 The
irrelevance of the purpose of the debt is what unites these five
63
states in the "managerial system."
At first glance, the managerial system seems rather wellreasoned. It is certainly an uphill battle to assert that a
creditor should be able to seize, in satisfaction of the debt
owed him, less than his debtor could voluntarily surrender.
Moreover, the managerial system seems relatively creditorneutral. By hinging creditor collection on a management
scheme, the rule does not facially reveal a preference for
Unfortunately, however, the
either creditor or spouse.
modern move to an equal management scheme and the
creation of a number of "exceptions" to the managerial system
in its pure form have undercut the rationality and neutrality
of the theory, thereby rendering it, once again, a device that
favors the creditor.
The move in California and Louisiana toward creditor
access to all community property, regardless of the
management rules, rather obviously supports the notion that
the managerial system's fundamental principles no longer
prevail. The basic rationale behind the managerial systemthat is, the correlation between voluntary and involuntary
seizure-has been completely undermined. In both California
2350 cmt. (c) (1980). There are a few statutory exceptions in California
exempting the earnings of the non-debtor spouse. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 910
Law Revision Commission cmt. (West 2004) (discussing the exceptions to the
general rule laid out in § 910).
62. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426; De Armond, supra note 48,

at 274.
63. It should be noted that while a creditor's ability to collect from the
community property does not depend on the classification of the debt as
community or separate, the order in which he may be able to seize property
may. Both California and Texas, for instance, have promulgated so-called
"marshalling" statutes, which may have the effect of requiring a creditor on a
"separate debt" to attempt to reach the debtor's separate property before going
after community property. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1000 (West 2004); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.203 (Vernon 2006).
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and Louisiana, a creditor may seize even property that the
non-debtor spouse may not voluntarily alienate-for example,
the non-debtor spouse's vehicle.6 4 And neutrality-that is,
reluctance to protect either the creditor or the spouses in
preference to the other-in these two states is virtually nonexistent. The state legislatures' decision to favor creditors
over spouses is all but stated outright.
Less easily recognized, however, is that Idaho and
Nevada have just as severely undercut the neutrality and
rationality of the managerial system. The neutrality of the
system was, in effect, undermined by the abolition of the head
and master rule. The regime chosen by eight of the nine
community property states to replace the previously malemanaged community was, and remains today, equal
66
management.6 5 All community property states but Texas
follow this scheme, allowing each spouse alone the right to
manage, control, and even dispose of virtually any type of
The result of the new equal
community property.
management scheme, when it is linked with the managerial
system of creditor collection, is that virtually everything
With equal
owned by the spouses is up for grabs.
really
one
that allows
system
is
management, the managerial
for seizure of just about all community property, for any selfinterested and non-family-related debt, without such a harsh
64. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2351,

cmt. b (1985).
65. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 9:12, at 466.
66. Texas has adopted a "separate but equal" scheme of management,

wherein each spouse retains the exclusive right to manage what he brings into
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (Vernon 2006); see also
the marriage.
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 9:12, at 467; REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at
345.
67. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (West
2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-14 (West
2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.16.030 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
766.51 (West 2001).
Of course, equal management is only a default rule. Some property is
excepted. Community real estate, for instance, is typically managed jointly by
the spouses, meaning that the concurrence of both is required for its alienation.
See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 9:12, at 468.
68. Indeed, at least one scholar has remarked that "with the advent of
[equal management] comes an increase in the liability of community property
for the debts of the spouses." Robert J. Stumpf, Note, Tort Debts Versus
Contract Debts: Liability of the Community Under California'sNew Community
Property Law, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1575, 1575-76 (1975).
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label. Connecting the creditor collection theory with the
realities of equal management reveals that the managerial
system is no longer neutral. As it is applied in today's
community property regime, it could hardly favor creditors
more.
Worse yet, the rationality of the managerial system has
been destroyed by a broadening that renders its fundamental
principles inoperative. Specifically, even states like Idaho
and Nevada, both of which have equal management and
operate under a "pure" managerial system 69 (i.e., do not
extend the rule to allow for seizure of all community property
as in California and Louisiana7 0 ), have wholly ignored the
system's application as it pertains to items managed by the
spouses jointly. Community real estate gives rise to the most
significant departure from the managerial system's basic
principles. Even in a state with an equal management
scheme, real estate is an asset that must typically be
The alienation of
managed by the spouses jointly.7 '
community real estate, in particular, requires the
concurrence of both spouses.72 Nonetheless, both Idaho and
Nevada have allowed the seizure of community real estate for
a debt incurred by just one spouse during marriage. 73 This
extension of pure managerial system theory is problematic
because it is inconsistent with the very premise on which the
managerial system is based-that of creditor access to
property the debtor spouse could alone obligate voluntarily."
Allowing a creditor to reach community real property gives
him far more rights than those given to the spouses
themselves.
In short, the change from the head and master scheme to
equal management, the broadening of the managerial system
in equal management states to include even jointly managed

69. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 448 (describing the meaning of

"pure" community debt system).
70. See id., at 426; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §
123.230(3) (LexisNexis 2004).
72. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Dougan, 76 P.2d 442, 449 (Idaho 1937) (Ailshie, J.,
dissenting); Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 639
(Tex. 1987) (Mauzy, J., dissenting) (citing the Florida Constitution).
73. See, e.g., Action Collection Serv., Inc. v. Seele, 69 P.3d 173, 177 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2003) (citing Holt v. Empey, 178 P. 703 (Idaho 1919)).
74. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426.
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property, and the decisions of California and Louisiana to
allow creditor access to all community property and not just
that managed by the debtor spouse, have morphed the
managerial system in ways not envisioned at its inception.
As a result, it is now extraordinarily creditor-friendly.
2. Delimiting the "Shadowy Boundary"Between Acts
"Servingthe Community" and "Individual
'Frolics"'-TheCommunity Debt System7 5
Arizona, New Mexico, Washington and Wisconsin have
rejected the managerial system and instead opted for what
has become known as the "community debt system."7 6 The
idea behind this system is that community property should
not be held for any and all debts incurred by either spouse
during marriage. Rather, in keeping with the status of the
community as a combination of property in the interest of and
for the benefit of both husband and wife, the community-and
particularly the non-debtor spouse's interest in it-should be
held only for a debt either spouse incurs "while acting for a
community benefit or purpose."7 7
Once this purpose or
benefit test is met, the obligation is classified as a
"community debt" and the result, in all community debt
states but Wisconsin7 8 is that the entirety of the community
75. Powell, supra note 7, at 36.
76. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 444; De Armond, supra note 48,

at 275; McDonald v. Senn, 204 P.2d 990, 998 (N.M. 1949).
77. Smith, supra note 48, at 808. Creditors for debts with no such beneficial
connection to the spouses-that is, creditors for separate debts--certainly may
not seek satisfaction from all of the community property in a community debt
state. But whether even the debtor's one-half interest in the community
property may be held varies among the four states subscribing to the
community debt system.
New Mexico and Wisconsin allow all separate creditors to seize the
debtor's one-half interest in the community property. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-310(A) (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2)(d) (West 1985). In the tort
setting, Arizona "is the only community property jurisdiction to strictly follow
the community debt rationale . . . thereby, granting complete immunity to

community property against separate tort judgments .... " Smith, supra note
43, at 806; see also Shaw v. Greer, 194 P.2d 430, 431 (Ariz. 1948). Washington,
in contrast, allows the seizure of the debtor's one-half interest for tort debts, but
not for contractual debts. Compare deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835, 837
(Wash. 1980), with Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985).
78. Wisconsin limits liability for community tort debts incurred during
marriage to "the property of [the debtor] spouse that is not marital property and
[] that spouse's interest in marital property."
Wis. STAT. ANN. §
7 66
.55(2)(c)(2)(cm) (West 2001). For contract debts, Wisconsin is aligned with
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property may be seized in satisfaction of the debt. 79 The
creditor's interest, then, extends to both his debtor's one-half
interest in the community property and to the innocent nondebtor spouse's one-half interest.
The rule is likely to strike the reader as logical. But its
application, once again, demonstrates that, perhaps even as
much as the managerial system, the community debt system
protects creditors at the expense of an innocent spouse. This
result does not obtain through the operation of the
fundamentals of the community debt system itself. Rather, it
follows from the creation of an evidentiary presumption that
is intended to aid in the application of the rule and because of
the definitions of community and separate debts that courts
have created to determine precisely what marital property
may be bound for a debt incurred during marriage.
First, three of the four states subscribing to the
community debt approach employ a presumption that a
contractual obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage
is one for the benefit of the community, and thus is a
community debt.80
The fourth community debt state,
Wisconsin, takes the presumption even farther, applying it to
tort as well as contract debts.8 '
Of course, the presumption means that a spouse claiming
that a debt is separate bears the burden of marshalling
evidence and so proving. 2 Moreover, every community debt
state has held that it must be overcome not with the
traditional civil litigation standard of preponderance, 3 but
the other three community debt states in allowing seizure of all community
property. Id. § 766.55(b).
79. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-11(A) (West 2006) ("Community debts
shall be satisfied first from all community property in which each spouse owns
an undivided equal interest .. ., excluding the residence of the spouses. Should
such property be insufficient, community debts shall then be satisfied by the
residence of the spouses .

. . .");

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215 (2000) (stating

that the entirety of community property may be seized for obligations bringing
community benefit).
80. See United Bank of Ariz. v. Allyn, 805 P.2d 1012, 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1990); First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Abraham, 639 P.2d 575, 577 (N.M.
1982); Malotte v. Gorton, 450 P.2d 820, 821 (Wash. 1969). No such presumption
exists for tort debts. See, e.g., Garrett v. Shannon, 476 P.2d 538, 540 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1970).
81. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 2001).
82. See, e.g., United Bank of Ariz., 805 P.2d at 1019.
83. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 437-38 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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rather by clear and convincing evidence.'
Wisconsin even
allows the debtor spouse to make the presumption conclusive,
and therefore irrebuttable, by executing a unilateral, signed
statement before the obligation is incurred stating that "the
obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of the marriage
or the family."8" The evidentiary effect of such a presumption,
plainly, is to put the creditor at a significant advantage before
the collection process even begins.
Second, even setting aside the presumption, community
debt states have defined the concept of the community debt so
broadly that "only a slight connection with the community
has been required."8 6 Perhaps the most egregious examples
come from Washington. In LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 7 for
instance, the Washington Supreme Court found a tort
judgment for sexual assault on a six-year-old child to be a
community debt. 8 Only the husband perpetrated the assault,
but because the crime occurred while the child was staying in
the family home under a paid baby-sitting arrangement, the
court determined that it was "done in the course of the
community business" and was therefore a community debt.8 9
Likewise, the Washington Court of Appeals held in
Benson v. Bush that an assault by a husband who sprayed
pepper spray in the plaintiffs face gave rise to a community
obligation for damages. 90 The altercation in Benson occurred
on husband's porch, where the plaintiffs and husband's dogs
began fighting. After breaking up the dog fight, plaintiff and
husband argued. "Sometime during the melee respondent
husband said, 'I would like to kill you and your dog."' 91 When
the plaintiff turned to leave, husband became enraged, "spun
[him] around" and sprayed the chemical into his face. 92 The
court found the debt for plaintiffs damages to be community,
84. See, e.g., Lorenz-Auxier Fin. Group v. Bidewell, 772 P.2d 41, 43 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1989); Malotte, 450 P.2d at 308-309; Warren v. Wash. Trust Bank, 575
P.2d 1077, 1085 (Wash. App. 1978).
85. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(1) (West 1985); see also Bank One, Appleton,
NA v. Reynolds, 500 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Park Bank-West v.
Mueller, 444 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
86. deElche v. Jacobsen, 622 P.2d 835, 837 (Wash. 1980).
87. LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 254 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1953).
88. Id. at 486.
89. Id.
90. Benson v. Bush, 477 P.2d 929, 930 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
91. Id. at 929.
92. Id. at 930.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 47

holding that husband's act "was in the course of or in
connection with the management of the community
93
property."
The debts in LaFramboise and Benson bear so little
relation to the community that it strains credulity to obligate
the community under a community debt theory under such
circumstances. The debts certainly brought no community
benefit, and arguably did not even maintain a sufficient
connection to any "community purpose" to warrant seizure of
the entirety of the community property. Perhaps the real
driving force behind classifying such debts as community is
that when the focus is on tort debts and the typically innocent
victim, these results seem more justifiable. It could be argued
that, as between the innocent victim and tortfeasor spouse,
putting the victim in a greater position to be compensated for
his damages warrants a stretching of the community debt
principle.
But one must remember that, in so stretching the
community debt concept, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Washington allow seizure of the non-debtor's interest in the
community property. 4 Husband's rape in LaFramboise, for
instance, would result in a proper garnishment of his wife's
wages, possibly for the remainder of her working life. Such a
result once again puts the creditor in a superior position visA-vis both his debtor spouse and an innocent spouse with no
connection to the debt other than marriage to the debtor.
All in all, for debts one spouse incurs during marriage, it
is difficult to say whether creditors fare better under the
managerial or community debt system. The truth is that they
fare quite well under both. No matter the system, the
creditor is very likely to have access to the entirety of both
the debtor and non-debtor spouse's interests in the
community property, for any and all manner of debt.
C. Double-Dipping:CreditorAccess to Non-Debtor Separate
Property
In addition to the exceptionally broad access a creditor
has to the community property interest of both spouses,
creditors often get an even further boon in that they may be
93. Id. at 929.
94. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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able to seize the non-debtor spouse's separate property. In
theory, creditors in a community property regime are not
given such broad rights of access. Indeed, nearly every
community property state, as a general rule, prohibits seizure
of a spouse's separate property for the other spouse's debt. 9
The problem is that exceptions have begun to proliferate that
threaten to swallow the general rule. Nowadays, every
American community property state recognizes at least some
theory which permits the separate property of the non-debtor
spouse to be seized for debts incurred by the other.
The most common exception to the general rule
prohibiting seizure of the non-debtor's separate property is
embodied in the "necessaries doctrine."96
Recognized by
statute today in five of the nine community property states,
the gist of the doctrine is that both spouses are personally
liable for certain debts, no matter who incurs them.9" This
95. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-215 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE §
913(b)(1) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-912 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2346, cmt. c (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-3-10 (West 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.202 (Vernon 2006);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.200 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2)(d)
(West 2001).
96. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 427-28 for a general discussion
of the necessaries doctrine.
97. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 914 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.090
(LexisNexis 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201 (a)(2) (Vernon 2006); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2) (West
2001). Although no statute in New Mexico sanctions the doctrine's application,
it was applied by the New Mexico Supreme Court back in 1940. See Nicholas v.
Bickford, 100 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1940).
Arizona has apparently rejected the necessaries doctrine. See, e.g.,
REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 428 (citing Samaritan Health Sys. v.
Caldwell, 957 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)).
Strangely, Louisiana courts have inappropriately recognized the
necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., Hall v. Lilly, 666 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (holding husband's separate property liable for a promissory note for
funds to build a home signed by wife alone). The Hall court relied on Louisiana
Civil Code article 2372, which provides: "A spouse is solidarily liable with the
other spouse who incurs an obligation for necessaries for himself or the family."
Id. (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2372). Article 2372, however, expressly
applies only to spouses who have opted out of the community property regime
and into a "separation of property regime," as it falls under the chapter of the
Louisiana Civil Code entitled "Separation of Property Regime."
See 16
KATHERINE S. SPAHT & W. LEE HARGRAVE, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAw TREATISE,
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES 312 (2d ed., West Group 1997). There is no foundation
in the Louisiana Civil Code, the primary source of law in Louisiana, see James
L. Dennis, Interpretationand Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation
of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993), for an application of the
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personal liability, then, means that both the debtor and nondebtor spouses' shares of the community property may be
seized, but more importantly, that creditors may even access
the non-debtor spouse's separate property.9"
Separate property liability is, at least in principle,
Although the
limited under the necessaries doctrine.
community property states recognizing such a doctrine often
use differing terminology-restricting this personal liability
to expenses for "necessaries"9 9 or, alternatively, "expenses of
the family"l°°-the notion is the same. The separate property
of a non-debtor spouse will only be held for a debt needed to
support the family.
Early in the doctrine's history, one court defined it to
include:
[S]uch articles of food or apparel, or medicine, or such
medical attendance and nursing, or such provided means
of locomotion, or provided habitation and furniture ...and
the like ... as the husband, considering his ability and
standing, ought to furnish his wife for her sustenance, and
the preservation of her health and comfort.1" 1
the
The idea behind the doctrine was that it furthered
10 2
spouses' now mutual duty to support each other.
Modem barbarizations of the doctrine have extended it
beyond recognition, though, such that it now covers much
more than what the average person would likely consider lifesustaining or necessary. Expenses for a maid, 10 3 and even
paying an appellate attorney to render legal aid on a criminal
possession 10 4 have become
conviction for marijuana
necessaries in the modern community property regime. The
result, of course, is that creditors benefit. The expansion of
the necessaries doctrine has allowed them to reach even
necessaries doctrine to spouses living under the state's default regime of
community property.
98. Thomas M. Featherston, Jr. & Amy E. Douthitt, Changing the Rules by
Agreement: The New Era in Characterization,Management, and Liability of
Marital Property,49 BAYLOR L. REV. 271, 316-17 (1997).
99. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 914 (West 2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.501,
3.201 (Vernon 1997).
100. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 2005).
101. Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Wis. 1980)
(citing Warner & Ryan v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517, 519 (Wis. 1871)).
102. See id.
103. See Wisnom v. McCarthy, 192 P. 337 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
104. See State v. Clark, 563 P.2d 1253 (Wash. 1977).
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beyond community property to the separate property of the
non-debtor spouse for debts that arguably carry little benefit
10 5
for the family.
The necessaries doctrine is not the only theory
community property states have employed to allow creditors
to seize the separate property of the non-debtor spouse. A
number of community property states have also employed
agency theories for this purpose. 1 6 Agency theory has been
applied in cases involving contractual liability, of course. For
example, in Lucci v. Lucci, °7 the Washington Supreme Court
found a husband personally liable for loans incurred solely by
his wife for the purpose of maintaining a grocery store
business.0 8
Husband was illiterate, and perhaps as a
consequence, his wife managed the business exclusively.' 9
When the wife alone signed a note for groceries for the store,
husband was nevertheless held responsible-and therefore
his separate property bound-under agency principles."0 The
court reasoned that "by [the spouses'] mutual agreement
[wife] was the managing agent of the grocery business.""'
Perhaps more strangely, community property states have
even used the agency doctrine to impose liability on the nondebtor spouse in tort cases. In Zernott v. Hobbie,"2 for
instance, a Louisiana appellate court found a husband
personally liable for the injuries of a minor victim struck by a
car driven by his wife. 13 The court premised its holding on
the notion that the husband was "vicariously liable" for his
4

wife's torts. "

105. Indeed, as one commentator remarked, "Recognizing that most doctrineof-necessaries cases today do not involve a neglectful spouse who refuses to
provide food, shelter, and clothing to the other spouse, it becomes apparent that
the doctrine owes its continued existence to its use as a collection device for
creditors." Shawn M. Willson, Comment, Abrogating the Doctrine of Necessaries
in Florida:The Future of Spousal Liability for Necessary Expenses After Connor
v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031,
1043 (1997).
106. Agency theory is occasionally applied to spouses by common law courts
as well. See, e.g., Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Zimmerman, 381 N.W.2d 218 (S.D. 1986).
107. Lucci v. Lucci, 99 P.2d 393 (Wash. 1940).
108. Id. at 396, 399.
109. See id. at 396.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Zernott v. Hobbie, 146 So. 2d 729 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
113. Id. at 732.
114. Id. Admittedly, agency and vicarious liability theories are not
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Community property states have applied theories of
ratification to the spouses with mixed results. In Alphonse
Brenner Co. v. Phillips,"5 a Louisiana court found that a
husband's use and enjoyment of non-necessary furniture
purchased by his wife obligated husband's separate
The husband made "no objections to the
property. 116
purchases made by his wife," and his "ratification" of her
purchase rendered him personally liable. 117 On the other
hand, the Washington Court of Appeals, in Smith v. Dalton,
while not rejecting the application of a ratification theory to
bind a non-debtor spouse's separate property in theory,
refused to apply it to obligate8 a wife's separate property for a
boat purchased by husband."
The wife's acts in Smith arguably rivaled those of the
husband in Phillips. The divergent results are difficult to
justify, as Mrs. Dalton apparently made no objection to her
husband's purchase of or procurement of the loan for a boat
(though the evidence does indicate that she had minimal
participation in both transactions)." 9 Wife did use and enjoy
the boat for leisure purposes "several times," 120 presumably as
synonymous. Absent any better explanation for the court's holding, however,
community property scholars have couched the Zernott decision as one resting
on principles of agency. See, e.g., REPPY & SAMUEL, supranote 47, at 427.
Louisiana courts have likewise employed principles of apparent
authority to bind the non-debtor spouse's separate property. See, e.g., Joe
Bonura, Inc. v. Parham, 413 So. 2d 214 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Alphonse Brenner
Co. v. Dickerson, 283 So. 2d 849 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
Both the Zernott and Bonura decisions were rendered during the head
and master period in Louisiana, when only husband could act to bind the
community property. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing
the "head and master" management scheme). In this light, it makes a bit more
sense that the courts would stretch to meet the principles of agency. In the
absence of agency, the community property would not be bound for either wife's
torts or contracts, and wife's separate property would be the only property
available to satisfy the debt. With the abolition of the head and master doctrine
in Louisiana in 1980, courts should now be more hesitant to employ agency, as
creditors now have full access to the entirety of the community property in
Louisiana for a wife's debts. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (1985); see also
REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 426.
115. Alphonse Brenner Co. v. Phillips, 338 So. 2d 183, 184 (La. Ct. App.
1976).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see also Royal Furniture Co. of Baton Rouge v. Benton, 256 So. 2d
614, 616 (La. 1972).
118. Smith v. Dalton, 795 P.2d 706 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
119. Id. at 708.
120. Id. at 710.
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the husband in Phillips used and enjoyed the furniture.
Nevertheless, the Washington court found such use of the
121
boat insufficient to give rise to ratification.
Even quasi-contractual theories like unjust enrichment
are occasionally employed in community property states to
bind the non-incurring spouse's separate property. In First
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance. Co., a
Louisiana court found a husband personally obligated for his
wife's embezzlement debt on a theory of unjust enrichment
where the embezzled funds were deposited into a joint
checking account.' 22
Arguably, unjust enrichment was
inappropriately used for creditor access to separate property,
at least under the facts of First State Bank. When the
embezzled funds were deposited into the joint bank account
there, it was the "marital community" that profited and not
the non-debtor husband. 2 3 The unjust enrichment should
therefore have been repaid from the community property, and
not the non-debtor's separate property. Nevertheless, quasicontractual theory has been applied, at least in Louisiana, to
hold separate property. 24 Other states have plainly rejected
the application of such a theory to bind the separate property
25
of the non-debtor spouse.
Finally, some scholars suggest that the Roman law
principle of negotiorum gestio, or "management of the affairs
of another," may apply in Louisiana-though likely not in any
other American community property state126-- to give
121. Id. Ratification was also rejected by the Washington court in Nichols
Hills Bank v. McCool, 701 P.2d 1114 (Wash. 1985), where a wife specifically
expressed her disapproval of a loan her husband made to their son.
122. First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 729
(La. Ct. App. 1981). Ratification was not a possibility in First State Bank
because husband had no knowledge of his wife's embezzlement. Id. at 731.
123. Compare id. with Smith, 795 P.2d at 710 (finding no individual

"enrichment" to spouse that did not use item purchased by other).
124. See, e.g., SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 313 (discussing First
State Bank, 399 So. 2d 729).
125. See Smith, 795 P.2d at 710.
126. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2292 cmt. a (1997). Negotiorum gestio is a
civilian institution with no common law equivalent. See John P. Dawson,
Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler,74 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819, 836
(1961). Thus, its application seems possible only in Louisiana, a jurisdiction
with a private law heavily based on the Roman civilian tradition. T.B. Smith,
The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in "Mixed Jurisdictions," in CIVIL
LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 10 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965)
(noting the influence of Roman law on Louisiana law).
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creditors access to the non-incurring spouse's separate
property. 127 No Louisiana court has ever applied these
principles for such a purpose, but the doctrine certainly seems
ripe for application here. The institution of negotiorum gestio
allows a person to act to manage another's affairs, even
without authority, when he reasonably believes the other
would sanction such action. 128 More importantly, it imposes
on the person whose affairs are managed a duty "to fulfill the
obligations that the manager has undertaken. " 1 29 Whether
this duty may allow a creditor access to separate property has
yet to be litigated, but the scope of the rule certainly leaves
open the possibility.
In sum, what seems like a relatively straight-forward,
and rather creditor-limiting rule in community property
states-that creditors typically may not seize the separate
property of a non-debtor spouse-is not so limiting after all.
The promulgation of exceptions such as the necessaries
doctrine, agency theory, ratification and quasi-contractual
theories such as unjust enrichment and perhaps even
negotiorum gestio have so eroded the general rule that it
hangs on only by a thread. A creditor trying to seize a nondebtor spouse's separate property in a community property
state these days will likely not be disappointed by the wide
variety of options available.
D. SacrificingAutonomy in the MaritalRelation: Creditor
Ability to DisregardSpousal Separation of Property
Agreements
Spouses domiciled in any of the nine community property
states today are free to contract around their state's legal
regime. 130 They can and do modify the legal regime (both

127. SPAHT

&

HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 312.

128. LA. Civ.CODE art. 2292 (1997).
129. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2297 (1997).
130. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (2000); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1500 (West

2004); IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 32-906 (1980); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (1985);

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.070 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3A-1
to -10 (West 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.202 (Vernon 2000); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.120 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.58 (West 2001); see
also Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington (Revised
1985), 61 WASH. L. REV. 13, 104-07 (1986); Mary Moers Wenig, Taxing
Marriage,6 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 561, 568 (1997).

Most states limit the freedom of the spouses to enter into just any
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before and after they marry) in a myriad of ways.' 3 ' Spouses
may, for example, increase the assets of the community 132 by
adopting the "universal community," whereby the community
includes not only the acquets and gains of the marriage, but
also any property brought into the marriage by either
spouse. 133 Spouses may likewise decrease the assets of the
community 3 4 by agreeing that the fruits of separate property,
which are community property in most community property
jurisdictions, 35 will remain separate property. Management
provisions may be modified, as may the rules regarding the
spouses' rights to reimbursement upon dissolution. 36 The
possibilities are virtually endless.
Even with all of these possibilities, by far the most
commonly executed matrimonial agreement in community
37
property states is the separation of property agreement.
Perhaps not coincidentally, these agreements are the ones
most likely to affect creditors' rights to collect on debts owed
by the spouses. When spouses sign a separation of property
agreement, they typically agree that the property each
acquires-through earnings, inheritance, or any other
vehicle-during
marriage will remain his separate
property. 13 Essentially, they are excluding the legal regime

matrimonial agreement. In Louisiana, for example, spouses may enter into
matrimonial agreements derogating from the rules of the legal regime of
community property set out in the Louisiana Civil Code, but they may not
"renounce or alter the marital portion or the established order of succession" or
"limit with respect to third persons the right that one spouse has alone under
the legal regime to obligate the community or to alienate, encumber, or lease
community property." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2330 (1985).
131. While postnuptial contracts were once disfavored, the last twenty years
have seen their acceptance grow such that they are now on par with prenuptial
agreements. See Laura Schofield Bailey, Note, Marital Property AgreementsBeing Creative with the New Legislation, 43 LA. L. REV. 159, 160 (1982)
(Louisiana prohibited post-nuptial agreements until 1979); Rebecca Glass,
Comment, Trading up: PostnuptialAgreements, Fairness,and a PrincipledNew
Suitor for California,92 CAL. L. REV. 215, 222-23 (2004).
132. SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 538.
133. Patrick N. Parkinson, Who Needs the Uniform MaritalProperty Act?, 55
U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 699 n.110 (1987).
134. SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 539.
135. Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules
and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 805 (1999).
136. SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, at 540-43.
137. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 33; see also SPAHT & HARGRAVE,
supra note 97, § 8.9, at 539.
138. See SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, § 8.9, at 539 (discussing the
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of community property altogether if they sign the agreement
before marriage, or, if they sign during the course of the
marriage, are "effectively dissolv[ing] the community
even
139
though the marital relation continues to exist."
The impact of a separation of property agreement on a
creditor, assuming it binds him, is great and apparent. That
creditor will now have rights of access to the property of the
debtor spouse only. 140
He will have no ability to reach
property earned or acquired by the non-debtor spouse.''
Further, these basic rules are not altered based on the debtor
spouse's inability to pay. If the creditor in a community
property state becomes a party to a juridical relation with an
unemployed spouse with no substantial assets, for example,
the creditor's recourse after a binding separation of property
agreement, with the limited exceptions addressed in prior
sections, is solely to squeeze anything possible from the
unemployed debtor spouse. Reaching the other spouse's
assets is generally not a possibility. 4 1 In essence, the signing
of a separation of property agreement by spouses domiciled in
a community property state, if binding on a creditor, puts
that creditor in the same position he finds himself in the
forty-one non-community property states.
The fairness of this change in position for the creditor
depends upon the timing of the creditor's relationship with
the debtor spouse. There are two possibilities. A creditor
may have established a relationship with his debtor prior to
the execution of a separation of property agreement; thus,
relative to the separation of property agreement, he is an
"existing creditor." On the other hand, a creditor may have
established a relationship with his debtor subsequent to the
signing of the matrimonial agreement; thus, relative to the
ability to designate various property under such an agreement in Louisiana,
including a total separate property regime).
139. Joann H. Henderson, MaritalAgreements and the Rights of Creditors, 19
IDAHO L. REV. 177, 203 (1983). A marital agreement executed during the
existence of a community property regime may have a particularly strong effect
on creditors, as it may "transmuteD" community property to separate property.
See id. at 177; see also REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 33.
140. See McCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 10:1, at 478.
141. Id.
142. See SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 97, § 8.9, at 539 ("Specified assets
can be kept out of the community ....).
143. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 10:1, at 478 (discussing jurisdictions
without community property systems).
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separation of property agreement, he is a "future creditor."
In theory, at least, existing and future creditors should
garner substantially different legal treatment. One might
expect that community property states would sanction the
enforcement of separation of property agreements against
future creditors of the spouses, but not against existing
After all, existing creditors have arguably
creditors.
established justifiable expectations that are not present, at
least to the same degree, for creditors who have not yet lent.
Surprisingly, however, no community property state overtly
distinguishes between these two classes of creditor.'" Both
existing and future creditors' fates are bound up together in
the various state laws that determine whether third parties
will be affected by matrimonial agreements.
At first blush, it may seem that the spouses' ability to
contract around the legal regime of community property in all
of the American community property states strikes a blow to
all creditors.
It is apparently the lone instance in the
community regime when the rights and freedom of the
spouses take precedence over their creditors. Yet in this case,
appearances are deceiving. While it is true that, if binding,
matrimonial agreements may significantly limit the rights of
creditors, community property states have displayed an
almost shocking resistance to applying these contracts to
creditors.
1.

Complete Ineffectiveness

Nevada provides the starkest example of this resistance.
Spouses are permitted (through special statutory authority)
to enter into matrimonial agreements which change the
characterization of property that would be community under
the state's default regime. 145 Separate property agreements,
of course, do just that, and thus are sanctioned by Nevada
law. 146
However, such agreements are "effective only as
between" the spouses.' 4 7
Third parties, most notably
creditors, may disregard these agreements altogether, as they
No other American
are wholly inapplicable to them.
144. See generally id. § 10:6-:7 (discussing creditors' rights, but identifying a
distinction between the type of debt rather than the type of creditor).
145. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (LexisNexis 2004).
146. Id. § 123.070.
147. Id. § 123.220.
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community property state so blatantly allows the rights of
creditors (either existing or future) to trump the freedom
spouses have to contract with one another and to have that
contract be respected by outsiders.
2.

Effectiveness Only Upon Actual Notice to Creditor

Wisconsin has taken an only slightly less creditorfriendly stance on the enforceability of separation of property
agreements affecting creditors. A separation of property
agreement there may not "adversely affect[] the interest of a
creditor unless the creditor had actual knowledge of that
provision when the obligation to that creditor was incurred..
"148

This statutory provision makes Wisconsin's rule one that,
in effect, though not facially, treats existing and future
creditors differently.
Under this actual knowledge rule,
existing creditors necessarily are unaffected by the spouses'
separation of property agreement, as they could not have had
actual knowledge of an agreement not in existence at the time
credit was extended.'4 9 Existing creditors, therefore, receive
complete protection under Wisconsin's actual knowledge rule.
However, the rule seems to entail at least the possibility
that separation of property agreements between the spouses
will have significant negative impact on future creditors.
Those creditors aware 150 of an agreement contrary to the
community property regime will be bound by that agreement
and will hold only the rights creditors in common law states
enjoy-namely, the right to access the debtor spouse's
property alone.' 5 '
The reality of the rule's application,
though, is much less antagonistic to creditors.

148. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(4m) (West 2001). The Uniform Marital
Property Act, on which Wisconsin's community property rules are based,
contains the same provisions. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 8(e), 9 U.L.A.
103 (1983).
149. See, e.g., Bank One, Appleton, NA v. Reynolds, 500 N.W.2d 337, 338-39
(Wis. App. 1993) (finding that the marital property agreement did not preclude
bank's seizure of wife's wages under guaranty agreement where obligation was
entered into earlier).
150. Recordation of a matrimonial agreement in Wisconsin provides a
creditor neither actual nor constructive notice. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.56(2)(a)
(West 2001).
151. McCLANAHAN, supra note 4, § 10:1, at 478; Newman, supra note 15, at
526 n.177.
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Although Wisconsin's actual knowledge rule does not
expressly distinguish between creditors in tort and contract,
its effect is to divide the two. Tort creditors of the spouses,
even after a separation of property agreement is signed, will
likely lack knowledge of the agreement.15 2 As such, there is
"no effective way, by marital property agreement, that
spouses may limit the exposure of marital property for tort
obligations incurred," precisely because of this lack of
knowledge. 11 3 For tort creditors, then, the seemingly harsh
actual knowledge rule may as well be the Nevada "no effect"
rule.154 It is essentially the same, though less transparent.
Even for contractual relationships, the actual knowledge
rule has the effect of placing the burden of imparting
knowledge of the matrimonial agreement on the spouses
rather than their creditors. In effect, it sets up perverse
incentives for a creditor, putting him in a better position if he
doesn't inquire into the existence of or take steps to discover
whether the spouses have executed a separation of property
agreement.1 5 The duty to inform is left on the shoulders of
the spouses, who are typically less sophisticated, and
especially given the lack of creditor incentive to raise the
issue of a marital agreement, much less likely to bear it.
In the end, for all types of credit relationships,
Wisconsin's knowledge rule is exceptionally benevolent to
creditors. In its application, it is not at all far removed from
the Nevada approach of prohibiting spousal separation of
property agreements from affecting creditors altogether.

152. See John T. Cross, The Conduct-RegulatingException in Modern United
States Choice-of-Law, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 455 (2003) (tort liability is

typically unplanned).
153. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.55 legislative council note.
154. See, e.g., Schultz v. Sykes, 638 N.W.2d 76, 79-80 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding a marital agreement ineffective against plaintiff establishing tort by
wife because plaintiff had no knowledge of the agreement at the time of the
tort).
155. Wisconsin does require creditors covered by the Wisconsin Consumer
Act delivering written credit applications to include a notice that "no provision
of a marital property agreement. . . adversely affects the interest of a creditor
unless the creditor, prior to the time credit is granted, is furnished a copy of the
agreement . . . or has actual knowledge of the adverse provision when the
obligation to the creditor is incurred." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.56(2)(b) (West
2001). The rule is a good start at shifting the burden of proof to creditors that
should be expanded beyond transactions involving written credit applications.
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Effectiveness Upon Recordation

Several community property states attempt to balance
the rights of the spouses to enter into an agreement
effectively modifying their legal regime with the rights of
creditors by imposing a recordation requirement. 15 6 Under
such a theory, a separation of property agreement is binding
between the spouses from the moment of its execution, but
binds third-party creditors only if recorded. 157 States forcing
recordation do so in substantially different ways, with
different results obtaining for creditors of the spouses. The
common thread, though, is that a recordation requirement of
any kind for the enforceability of matrimonial agreements
makes for one of the most spouse-friendly alternatives. Yet
even with recordation requirements, creditors garner
significant protection.
a.

ForAny Effectiveness at All

Louisiana has taken a comparatively bold step in favor of
placing spousal rights to enter into binding marital
agreements above creditors' rights. 158 The Louisiana Civil
Code provides that "a matrimonial agreement ... is effective
toward third persons as to immovable property, when filed for
registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
property is situated and as to movables when filed for registry
in the parish or parishes in which the spouses are
domiciled."1 59 Any type of creditor, for any type of property,
then, is bound by a matrimonial agreement only if it is
recorded.
The Louisiana Civil Code goes farther than any other
community property state in favoring the spouses by
enforcing separation of property agreements against both tort
and contract creditors consistently and against creditors with
concerns in both movable and immovable property
consistently. It also adopts the most spouse-friendly solution
in hinging the enforceability of matrimonial agreements on
recordation because it rejects inquiries into actual notice. 6 °
156. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-917 to -919 (2006); LA. CIV. CODE art.
2332 (1985).
157. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2332 (1985).
158. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 79-80.
159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2332 (1985).

160. See Lee Hargrave, Public Records & PropertyRights, 56 LA. L. REV. 535,
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The actual knowledge of a creditor surrounding the execution
of a matrimonial agreement is irrelevant in Louisiana; he is
bound by the agreement only if it is properly recorded.1 6 '
b. For Real Estate Only
Idaho requires marital agreements, including separation
of property contracts, to be recorded, but scales back the
Louisiana rule to require recordation only for contracts that
affect real estate. 1 62 Under such a rule, some creditors,
namely mortgagees, are highly protected. They are not bound
by separation of property agreements unless those
agreements are recorded in the county of the real estate's
situs. 16 3 There is certainly a possibility that a creditor may be
prejudiced by such a recordation rule; he may lose his right to
collect in accordance with his expectations if he does not
check the records and discover a separation of property
agreement.
But most would likely find such a result
appropriate. "Greater care is taken with realty transactions;
more money is involved than with many items of personal
property so that a title search and insurance are customary..
,164

The real estate recordation requirement seems to strive
toward the same worthy goal that Louisiana's recordation
requirement does-making matrimonial agreements between
the spouses enforceable only by creditors who have notice of
them and, contrary to the Wisconsin method, actually placing
the burden of gaining that knowledge on the creditor rather
than the spouses. But the Idaho rule misfires in at least two
ways.
First, the rule is flawed in that it fails to deal with the
spouses' relationship with the vast majority of their creditors
by limiting its application to separation of property
agreements affecting real estate. The rule plainly leaves
548-50 (1996).
161. See id.
162. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-917 to -919 (2006). The language of the Idaho

statute actually only covers "marriage settlements," but it has been construed to
apply to marital agreements such as separation of property contracts as well.
See Stevens v. Stevens, 16 P.3d 900, 903 (Idaho 2000); see also W.J.
BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 81-82 (1962).
163. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-917 to -919 (2006); see also Henderson, supra

note 139, at 179.
164. Henderson, supra note 139, at 180.
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creditors dealing with the spouses on personal property
Spousal separation of property agreements
unprotected.
presumably can affect these future creditors of the spouses on
debts relating to personal property, and they may be forced to
take subject to unknown, and even "secret," separation of
property agreements.1 65
If such a rule prevailed in Idaho because it was found to
best balance the rights of the spouses with those of their
creditors, the rule would be justifiable, and maybe even
praiseworthy for elevating the spouses' ability to make
binding agreements above creditors' rights. It seems more
likely, though, that it is just another inconsistency without
theoretical justification. Particularly given the large volume
of wealth associated with personal property transactions
these days, personal property creditors of the spouses should
be granted the same rights to contest spousal separation of
property agreements as those granted to real estate creditors.
Idaho missteps in treating the two classes of creditors
differently.
Second, the Idaho recordation rule leaves tort creditors
unprotected. Mortgagees or any other creditors with some
connection to a particular parcel of spousal land will check
the records for a separation of property agreement or fairly be
limited to the separate property assets of the incurring
spouse. Judgment creditors, and especially tort creditors, are
not in such a position for advance planning. 16 6
The
recordation of a matrimonial agreement will not be discovered
by these parties until well after the debtor-creditor
relationship has arisen, yet the contract will nevertheless
bind them.
The "notice" function of the recordation
requirement is wholly ineffective here.
While it makes some sense to enforce separation of
property agreements even against creditors not in a position
to discover them in advance of the creation of a juridical
relation with the spouses, it does not make sense to do so in
the way Idaho does. Idaho's rule essentially favors the
contractual, real estate-oriented creditors over the spouses,
but then subordinates tort creditors to the spouses. If Idaho's
goal in adopting a recordation requirement is to allow
165. Id.
166. See id.
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creditors the opportunity to discover separation of property
agreements before they will be bound by them, then the state
should adopt a rule that affords the same protection to tort
creditors of the spouses-with no possibility of discovering a
recordation before the obligation is incurred-as is granted to
contractual creditors like mortgagees. In short, the laudable
spousal protection that could be achieved through a
recordation rule is ill-applied when it is limited to real estate
scenarios. The result-placing contractual creditors above
the spouses but tort creditors behind them-is theoretically
indefensible and inequitable.
4.

Effectiveness as to CreditorsOnly Upon Mutual
Observance by the Spouses
Finally, Washington allows matrimonial agreements
between the spouses to be enforced against creditors only
when those agreements are "mutually observed" by the
spouses. 167 The rule aims to ensure that marital agreements
are not "shams" or deals undertaken solely to immunize the
spouses from liability to their creditors.
Washington courts have applied the requirement to allow
creditors to garnish the wages of a non-debtor spouse despite
the existence of a separation of property agreement. 168 In In
re Diafos, for instance, a premarital tort creditor of the
husband sought to garnish the non-debtor wife's wages,
claiming that, as community property, they were seizable for
husband's tort debt. 69 Wife defended on grounds that she
and her husband had signed a prenuptial agreement
establishing a regime of separation of property, and that the
agreement precluded husband's creditor from seeking
recourse from her earnings. 70 The court allowed the creditor

167. Mumm v. Mumm, 387 P.2d 547, 549 (Wash. 1964). This theory of
enforceability of marital agreements is different from the others discussed in
this section because it is not solely a matter of creditor enforcement. To be valid
even between the spouses themselves, a marital agreement in Washington must
be mutually observed. Id. However, its frequent use as a creditor-asserted
defense makes it an appropriate subject for study here. See, e.g., Kolmorgan v.
Schaller, 316 P.2d 111 (Wash. 1957); In re Diafos, 37 P.3d 304 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001).
168. See, e.g., Kolmorgan, 316 P.2d at 111; In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 304.
169. In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 306.
170. Id. at 308.
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to attempt an attack on the marital agreement 17' and noted
that "Iclourts will honor a challenged property agreement
between husband and wife if the party asserting the
protection of the agreement can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence...
that both spouses have abided by the
1 72
agreement."
The idea behind requiring mutual observance before a
marital agreement will bind creditors is basically an
equitable one. The Diafos court explained that "it would
encourage a sorry state of affairs in our domestic relations...
[if spouses were able] to charge the community with all the
expenses of the living.., and credit the separate estate with
the gross earnings." 7 3 In light of this policy objective, the
mutual observance requirement is often described as a ban on
"disproportionate 0 subsidizing."1 74
Use of one spouse's
separate earnings to pay for everyday expenses that benefit
the couple and simultaneous attempts to use a separation of
property agreement to block creditor access to those same
earnings--or disproportionate subsidizing-is prohibited.'7 5
The gist of the rule is that spouses may not assert a marital
agreement against a third-party creditor when they
themselves are not complying with the spirit of the
agreement and truly remaining "separate in property."
Whatever the justification for the rule, it provides
another hurdle for spouses attempting to deviate from the
community property regime's harsh collection rules. The
spouses' contract may be scrutinized on yet another basis not
covered under the general rules of contract enforcement. A
finding of non-observance, once again, can only help the
Washington creditor.
When the rules regarding creditor seizure of community

171. Prior jurisprudence and doctrine indicated that separation of property
agreements in Washington would not be binding on existing creditors-those
"whose basic claim[s] existed at the time of the agreement." See Fisher v.
Marsh, 125 P. 951 (Wash. 1912); Cross, supra note 130, at 107 (1986). More
recent Washington jurisprudence, with the Diafos decision standing as a clear
example, has apparently rejected the distinction and allowed both existing and
future creditors to be bound by marital agreements provided they are not
mutually observed. See In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 304.
172. Id. at 309.
173. Id. (quoting Kolmorgan, 316 P.2d at 111).
174. See, e.g., id. at 309; REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 47, at 460.

175. In re Diafos, 37 P.3d at 309.
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property, both for debts incurred during and before marriage,
are considered along with doctrines allowing creditor access
to non-debtor separate property, the picture for the spouses is
bleak enough. Since the tide toward equal management
swept the community property states:
The wife may now obligate the community funds, not only
for the debts she creates during the marriage, but also for
her antenuptial debts .... The common funds are now
available to creditors of both husband and wife during
marriage, and an individual spouse's creditors may seek
satisfaction from the community assets ... as well as from
the separate assets of the debtor-spouse. Married women,
formerly wailing for access to one-half of the community
property as security for their debts to promote increased
extension of credit to them now have that credit in double
. .. It is the best of all possible worlds for the
measure 76
creditor.1

The rules trending toward non-enforcement of matrimonial
agreements against third-party creditors merely reinforce
this creditor superiority.
III. ARE CREDITORS OVERPROTECTED?
Creditors of spouses living under the community regime
are in a demonstrably strong position. But is this really a
It is certainly a relevant consideration in
problem?
evaluating "the excellence of a system of law applicable to
marital property."1 77 If the community property regime is to
continue to stand the test of time and persist in the American
states in the midst of overwhelming acceptance of the
common law marital property system, its efficacy will have to
be continually supported. The propriety of the system should
be evaluated both with reference to "the 'fairness' of the
adjustments made by it between spouse and spouse" and "by
the extent to which it affords adequate protection to all
parties concerned when the family" deals with creditors. 78
The community regime does a great deal to help the spouses'
creditors. Arguably, it does too much in light of its purpose,
176. Nina Nichols Pugh, The Evolving Role of Women in the Louisiana Law:
Recent Legislative and Judicial Changes, 42 LA. L. REv. 1571, 1575-76 (1982)
(emphasis added).
177. Powell, supra note 7, at 16-17.
178. Id. at 17.
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other more general laws, and party expectations.
A. Straying from the Rationale Behind the Regime
An examination of the rationale behind the adoption of
the community regime in the nine community property states
shows just how far the regime has strayed from its initial
goals.
The reasons typically cited by the western and
Spanish-influenced states for their nineteenth-century initial
adoption of the community property system are really quite
clear. At the time, the most salient and well-respected
feature of the community was its innovations in the area of
women's rights.17 9 Simply put, the early community property
regime was perceived as a system that improved upon the
80
common law's treatment of women.
The community property regime's history demonstrates
its strides in this area. The regime is believed to have
originated as early as the fifth century with Germanic tribal
peoples.' 81 Far from wallflowers and servants, the female role
in these societies was one of partnership with the male in the
varied, and often violent, tasks required for daily survival. 8 2
"[Tihe wives who shared the fighting were thought to be
worthy of a share in the spoils."1 8 3 Thus, while the common
law of the time subscribed to a theory of "merger," whereby a
wife's legal personality merged with her husband's upon
marriage and she was incapable of owning property,1 s8 the
civil law began to conceive of the wife's status in marriage
differently.
This perception of the wife as a valuable contributor to
the family gave rise to the notion that the mass of acquets
during marriage to which each spouse contributed-"the
community"--should be shared equally by the spouses. 8 5 The

179. Kirkwood, supra note 5, at 11.
180. See MCKAY, supra note 5, at 64-65; Kirkwood, supra note 5, at 11.
181. See HARRIETT SPILLER DAGGETI, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
OF LOUISIANA 4 (1945); DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 39, at 17-18, supra

note 5, at 7.
182. See DAGGETT, supra note 181, at 4.
183. Id.

184. See Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 48 (1981).
185. GRACE G. BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (4th ed.

2003).
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community regime, then, diverged from the common law
through its recognition of the marriage between husband and
wife as a sort of economic partnership." 6
The traceable history of the adoption of the community
property regime in the few American states that have chosen
it reveals that this same purpose prompted the initial
adoption of the regime.
Unfortunately, few legislative
discussions have been preserved that enable historians to
look into the minds of early nineteenth-century lawmakers
deciding between the traditional common law matrimonial
property scheme and the then-foreign community property
regime. 1
The relatively scant record that does exist,
however, is quite telling.
California's
1849
Constitutional
Convention,
surprisingly, provides the most insight. The delegates to the
convention had before them not a choice between adoption of
a common law or community property system, but rather a
proposal making clear that property acquired by a wife before
marriage and afterwards by donation would be her separate
property.18 8 The proposed "Section 13" read:
All property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or
claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired
afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her
separate property, and laws shall be passed more clearly
defining the rights of the wife, in relation as well to her
separate property as that held in common with her
husband. Laws shall also be passed providing
for the
89
registration of the wife's separate property.
Even though the decision of whether to adopt the community
property regime was not plainly raised by Section 13's text,
the delegates "realized that . . . Section 13 embodied
something more than simply the establishment of married
women's property rights, and that it was rooted in Spanish
law." 90 The delegates, then, spent the majority of their time
186. Erlanger & Weisberger, supra note 3, at 771.
187. Kirkwood, supra note 5, at 9.
188. See J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF
CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER

AND OCTOBER, 1849, at 257-58 (1850).

189. Id. at 257.
190. Donna C. Schuele, Community Property Law and the Politics of Married
Women's Rights in Nineteenth-Century California, 7 W. LEGAL HIs. 245, 255
(1994).
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in this area debating the community and common law
systems for handling spousal property.'9 1
Speaking in favor of Section 13 and the civilian notion of
community property in general, one delegate-Tefft, a New
its
York lawyer originally from Wisconsin'92-argued
necessity to protect the "helpless" family from a husband
"bring[ing] his family to penury and want." 93 More lightheartedly, delegate Halleck, a bachelor and California's thenSecretary of State, 9 4 noted:
I am not wedded either to the common law or the civil law,
nor as yet, to a woman; but having some hopes that some
time or other I may be wedded . . .I shall advocate this
section in the Constitution, and I would call upon the
bachelors in this Convention to vote for it. I do not think
we can offer a greater inducement for women of fortune to
get us
come to California. It is the very best provision to
195
wives that we can introduce into the Constitution.
Without much objection, Section 13 was adopted, and
became a part of California's 1849 Constitution.196 And while
the provision did not clearly mandate a community regime, by
the late nineteenth century, California was recognized as a
community property state. 9 7
More than one hundred years later, the state of
Louisiana was revisiting the community property articles of
its Civil Code, first put into written form in 1808.19 The
reporter of a group of scholars that worked under the
Louisiana State Law Institute to revise Louisiana's
matrimonial regimes law, 99 in discussing the policies that
should be in the foreground of any reform, cited, among other

191. See BROWNE, supra note 188, at 257-69.
192. Brian McGinty, Common Law and Community Property: Origins of the
CaliforniaSystem, 51 CAL. ST. BARJ. 478, 481 (1976).
193. BROWNE, supra note 188, at 259.
194. McGinty, supra note 192, at 481.
195. BROWNE, supra note 188, at 259.
196. Id. at 269.
197. BLUMBERG, supra note 185, at 75-76.
198. MOREAU LISLET, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAws Now IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS 323-24 (1808); see also Robert A. Pascal, Updating
Louisiana'sCommunity of Gains, 49 TUL. L. REV. 555, 555 (1975).
199. The Louisiana State Law Institute is the scholarly group created by the
Louisiana Legislature to undertake the study and drafting of Louisiana civil
law reforms.
Katherine S. Spaht, Background of Matrimonial Regimes
Revision, 39 LA. L. REV. 323, 323 (1979).
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things, the community's: (1) "recognition of spouses as
equals"; (2) allowance of "freedom ... to agree that each may
serve the family in different ways without either one
suffering any lesser position in relation to property by a
choice of a function that does not directly bring new wealth
into the family"; and (3) "encourage [ment] [of] each spouse to
serve the family with best abilities, and encourage[ment] of
mutual respect for the service each performs." 0
The comments of both the delegates to the 1849
California Constitutional Convention and the reporter on
Louisiana's matrimonial regimes revision are important
because they demonstrate the impetus for the adoption and
retention of the community property regime. It seems that
scholars and lawmakers in the nineteenth century, just as in
the twentieth century, desired "[to] implant[ a more
equitable property system for spouses and [to] provid[e] a
family binder at a time of apparent crisis in the family
relation." 1 Both the California delegates' and the Louisiana
reporter's comments make this clear. The driving forces
behind the adoption and retention of community property
regimes were a desire to protect the family, grant equality
and recognize both spouses' contributions, and even
encourage immigration and new marriages.
Despite this strong undercurrent of family values, which
propelled the adoption of community property laws, the rights
of creditors were not ignored either in Louisiana's late
twentieth-century revision or in the 1849 California
Constitutional Convention. In California, for instance, a
number of vociferous delegates decried the burden on
creditors resulting from the insulation of any property of
either spouse. Delegate Botts, an attorney and magazine
editor from Virginia,0 2 spoke most openly in favor of
creditors' rights:

200. JANET MARY RILEY, LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, REVISION OF
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870, BOOK III, TITLE VI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH OF THE ALTERNATIVE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL 5 (1976).

201. DAGGETT, supra note 181, at 310; see also MCKAY, supra note 5, at 65
("In this combat of social forces the advantage of the community property
system is that it is a conservative power operating to keep for us the old spirit of
the family.").
202. McGinty, supra note 192, at 481.
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I want to know to whose benefit is this provision to enure?
What is the provision? That a married woman shall enjoy
the use and control of her own property without any
regard to the acts and doings of her husband; that is to
say, that the husband and wife together may enjoy my
property and yours, and become possessed of thousands
and thousands, leaving us beggars; and then, sir, under
this system, while they are indebted to us together for
that which they here jointly used and occupied, under the
they may leave us pennyless while
pretence of this clause,
20 3
they revel in luxury.
Section 13 ultimately passed despite these creditor concerns.
Thus, while creditors' interests were certainly considered in
the adoption of the community property regime in California,
they were "subordinated to the well-being and interest of the
204
family.
This glance at history highlights the problem with the
community regime today. The community property states
have taken gradual steps in favor of creditors' rights in
different areas which, viewed individually, are nearly
imperceptible. But when considered in globo, it becomes
obvious that this emerging favoritism for creditors is taking
us farther and farther away from allowing the community
regime to serve the purposes for which it was created.
To the extent state lawmakers sought to prevent families
from being rendered helpless by one spouse's bad acts
through the adoption of the community regime, 2° - many of
today's American community property regimes are a failure.
The liability of the entirety of the community property in
Louisiana for either spouse's premarital debts, for instance,
subjects the family to considerable financial risk for debts
likely wholly unconnected to it. This modern "innovation" did
not come from the community's Spanish ancestors 2 6 and
clearly leans away from the family protection behind adoption
of the community property regime.
Similarly, if delegate Halleck's desire to attract women to
203. BROWNE, supra note 188, at 268.
204. John D. Lyons, Development of Community PropertyLaw in Arizona, 15
LA. L. REV. 512, 524 (1955) (quoting 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 468-69 (1943)).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 192-197.
206. See Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 512-13 (La. 1973)
(Summers, J., dissenting).
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a community property state, °7 or more appropriately in
today's world, citizens in general, is one shared by the
populus, the American community property regimes are
bound to fail. Few persons with knowledge of a scheme
allowing seizure of all community property for antenuptial
debts and refusing to enforce a valid separation of property
agreement avoiding this harsh effect would choose such a
regime on its merits. The regime itself, at least today, should
push prospective citizens to flee! Assuming any spouse were
choosing among potential domiciles solely on the basis of their
matrimonial regimes-which, of course, is unlikely-the
creditor-friendly nature of the community property regime
may overwhelm its positive partnership-like features and
make it an easy loser in comparison with the marital property
regime of the forty-one common law states.
The problem may even be more severe though. For those
spouses-likely the vast majority-who choose a domicile for
reasons other than the property regime it affords, the new
creditor bent of the community property regime may even
discourage marriage. Particularly when a state refuses to
recognize the validity of a matrimonial agreement
establishing a separate property regime, few choices remain
available. Unable to contract out of an undesirable regime,
and unwilling to move, the parties may opt for some
arrangement other than marriage.2"'
The community's
envisioned "binder at a time of apparent crisis in family
relation"20 9 is all but destroyed.
B. Ignoring CreditorRepayment Estimates
Yet another problem with the broad grant of rights to
creditors in community property states is that reasonable
creditor expectations are either overlooked or ignored.
Creditors in both contract and tort may well win the
figurative lottery if their previously single debtors marry in a
community property state. The creditor may experience a

207. See supra text accompanying notes 194-195.
208. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02, cmt. b (2000); see also Developments in the LawThe Law of Marriage and Family, Marriage as Contract and Marriage as
Partnership: The Future of Antenuptial Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2075, 2084 (2003).
209. See DAGGETT, supra note 181, at 310.
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windfall not possible in the forty-one non-community property
states in having available for seizure assets to which he
should not have reasonably anticipated access. 210 The most
egregious example of such a windfall, of course, is the liability
of the entirety of the spouses' community property for the
premarital-and likely wholly un-family-related--debt of a
single spouse.2 '
In contractual arrangements, "credit is [typically]
extended based on an estimate of the debtor's ability to repay
out of future income."21 2 Because of the bargain struck by the
parties, the creditor should certainly be permitted to collect
from the debtor in accordance with his estimates. Holding
the debtor's wages after marriage immune merely because
those wages have become part of the community between
husband and wife, besides making possible the marital
bankruptcy, is problematic because it removes fairly
estimated income from the creditor's grasp.21 3 Indeed, every
American community property state has so recognized in
allowing for the seizure of some community property to satisfy
a single spouse's premarital debt.2 14
What some community property states have failed to
recognize, however, is that overcorrecting to prevent the
marital bankruptcy 2 5 results in inequities just as severe.
"Antenuptial creditors extend credit . . . while [the debtor
spouse] has only a separate estate; they do not bargain for,
and should not, after the marriage, be entitled to the benefit"
of a community estate that includes the non-debtor spouse's
Allowing an antenuptial
earnings and acquisitions.21 6
creditor to seize the entirety of the community property
simply gives that creditor a windfall in allowing him not only
the future income and acquisitions of his debtor, but also
those of a third party to the debtor-creditor relationship. The
creditor gets an unbargained-for advantage.21 7
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. See supra Part II.A.
212. Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Liability of Community Property for
Antenuptial Debts and Obligations,68 A.L.R. 4th 877, 883 (1989).
213. McCLANAHAN, supra note 4, at 490; Fischer, supra note 213, at 883.
214. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part II.A.
216. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 513 (La. 1973) (Summers,
J., dissenting).
217. See 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (rev. ed. 1993)
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For contract creditors, then, the rule of full community
property seizure should be rejected in favor of a rule that
more accurately effectuates the parties' expectations at the
time of their agreement. Allowing a creditor to access some of
the community property of a debtor who was single when the
debt was incurred and later marries is necessary to prevent
the marital bankruptcy and to appropriately honor the
creditor's future income estimates, thereby giving him his
bargained-for due. But given the contrary interests of the
family, and the need for protection of the earnings of a new
spouse uninvolved in the debt, these problems can be less
intrusively handled by allowing the premarital creditor to
More
seize only his debtor's wages after marriage.
expansively, a creditor could be granted access to his debtor's
one-half interest in the community property, regardless of the
means of acquisition. This approach may even better honor
creditor income estimates, as a creditor will typically consider
not only earnings, but also profits from passive investments
and any other "income" the prospective debtor is likely to
bring in when making the lending decision.2 1
Some
community property states have adopted these more modern
solutions, appropriately balancing the interests of the spouses
vis-A-vis their creditors.21 9
Other community regimes,
particularly Louisiana, in allowing seizure of the entirety of
the community property for either spouse's premarital
contractual obligations, 220 remain woefully inadequate.
The idea that a creditor should have access to community

(describing the very purpose of the body of contract law as a means of ensuring
that bargains are upheld and reasonable expectations protected).
218. In lieu of either articulated solution, present Spanish law generally
immunizes the community property from the spouses' premarital debts. See
Creech, 287 So. 2d at 509 n.12 (discussing the Codigo Civil de Espafia).
However, once all community obligations have been satisfied and the separate
property of the debtor spouse has been extinguished, the community property
may be held. See id.
219. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.050 (LexisNexis 2004) ("Neither
the separate property of a spouse nor his share of the community property is
liable for the debts of the other spouse contracted before the marriage."); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.16.200 (1983) (debtor's earnings bound for his premarital debt,
provided judgment is entered within three years of marriage); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
766.55(2)(c)(1) (West 2001) (stating premarital debt may be satisfied from
debtor's separate property 'and from that part of marital property which would
have been the property of that spouse but for marriage").
220. See supra text accompanying notes 24-45.
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property only insofar as it honors his expectations before the
debtor-creditor relationship was solidified is certainly less
persuasive when torts are considered. The tort creditor, of
course, bargains for nothing,2 2 ' and is entitled to be made
whole for his damages without regard to his expectations.
Full liability of community property, however, still goes too
far. It allows the seizure of the non-debtor spouse's earnings,
which have no connection to the other's premarital debt. This
windfall a tort creditor gets when his previously single debtor
marries is simply inappropriate. Such a boon cannot be
sanctioned where the earnings and income of the innocent
spouse are at stake. "If courts would maintain the integrity
of the community regime .... in a conflict between the rights
of the creditor and the security and well-being of the wife and
family, the choice must lie with the interpretation favoring
the wife and family."2 22
C. Providing Unnecessary Layers of Protection
Further problems with the creditor-friendly nature of the
rules governing marital property in community property
states are exposed when other, more general legal rules in
those jurisdictions are given due consideration. Quite often,
the community property regime provides a creditor protection
duplicative of that afforded all parties under other basic legal
principles. The community property states' move toward
binding separate property under the necessaries doctrine and
toward disregarding the provisions of separation of property
agreements are just two examples of unnecessary
overprotection.
1.

Agency as a Replacement for the Necessaries Doctrine

The proliferation of rules binding the non-debtor spouse's
separate property for debts for necessaries incurred by the
other certainly increases the likelihood that a creditor for
necessaries will succeed in recovering the monies due him.2 23
An additional theory of recovery often not available in noncommunity property states is now granted the creditor.2 2 4

221.
222.
223.
224.

See Cross, supra note 152, at 455.
Creech, 287 So. 2d at 513 (Summers, J., dissenting).
See Willson, supra note 105, at 1043-1044.
Most common law states at some point recognized the necessaries
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The problem with the necessaries doctrine as applied here is
that, once again, it goes too far. Doctrines of agency, wellaccepted in every state no matter its marital property
scheme,225 could just as competently handle the problem with
less theoretical discord. When agency principles are applied
between the spouses, the result is the same as that of the
necessaries doctrine-the separate property of the non-debtor
spouse is held for the debt, despite the non-debtor's lack of
participation in the debt's creation.
Taking agency seriously as the only method of binding
the non-debtor's separate property could potentially result in
fewer proper seizures of such property than the necessaries
doctrine currently allows. Since the abolition of the head and
master scheme of management, spouses are no longer
considered agents of each other merely by virtue of their
marital relationship.2 2 6 To bind a non-debtor's separate
property under agency theory, actual, implied, or apparent
authority would be needed, as with all principal-agent
relationships. 22 7 But such authority, particularly implied,
would likely exist for debts incurred for the shelter, food, and
clothing of the spouses. Such debts-those that truly embody
the meaning of the word "necessaries"-comport with the
original concept of the necessaries doctrine.228
The true advantage of jettisoning the necessaries
doctrine in favor of a reliance on agency principles is that it
would prevent courts from having to expand the concept of
"necessaries" ridiculously, and from thereby rendering the
doctrine utterly illogical. The purpose of the debt would be
less important, and instead, the authorization of the nondoctrine to encourage provision of supplies to women, who were legally unable
to contract for them on their own. See id. at 1031-32. However, a number of
states abrogated the doctrine in the wake of twentieth-century recognition of a
woman's existence as a legal person separate and apart from her husband. See
id. at 1050. Only twenty-eight common law states still recognize the doctrine.
See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 838
(2004).
225. See
ROBERT
W.
HAMILTON,
BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS:
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS, ESSENTIAL
TERMS AND CONCEPTS § 2.1, 2.8-12 (1996).

226. Joann Henderson, For Better or For Worse: Liability of Community
PropertyAfter Bankruptcy, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 893, 908 (1992).
227. HAMILTON, supra note 226, § 2.1.
228. See Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Wis.
1980).
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debtor, through actual or apparent authority, would be the
critical inquiry. There is simply no need for the necessaries
doctrine given modern agency theory.
2. FraudulentTransfer Statutes for the Protectionof
Existing Creditors
The community property push toward allowing creditors
to disregard marital agreements that are otherwise binding
between the spouses likewise unnecessarily overprotects.
Rules governing fraudulent transfers are now a part of the
law in all nine community property states,22 9 and these rules
provide a remedy to those creditors most deserving of special
protection when a debtor spouse attempts to modify the
community property regime. Less deserving creditors should
bear the burden of self-protecting.
To understand how the problem of the enforceability of
marital agreements against third-party creditors would be
treated absent special, and overreaching, community property
rules, it is necessary to do what most community property
states seem to have rejected-that is, to treat existing and
future creditors separately. Once such a division is made, it
becomes easier to see how the current community property
treatment of creditors affords them too many rights.
Existing creditors are those unquestionably worthy of the
greatest protection, particularly those that lent to just one
spouse while the community regime was in progress.23 0 It
could certainly be argued that, given the proliferation of
marital agreements and the likelihood that the spouses could
opt out of the community at any moment, a creditor should
229. See Marsha E. Simms, Acquisition Financing, in PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, ASSET-BASED FINANCING 2006, at 346-47 (2006) (noting that all
community property states but Louisiana have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act). The Louisiana Civil Code allows creditors to use the revocatory
and/or oblique actions to set aside transfers that would likely qualify as
fraudulent transfers in other states. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2036, 2044
(1987).
230. Of course, a creditor may lend to an unmarried spouse, who later
marries and signs a separation of property agreement. In this situation, it is
even easier to see why the community property rules rejecting the application of
marital agreements to existing creditors should be set aside. The creditor here
stands in the shoes of all creditors for antenuptial debts and there is no
justification for allowing him to recover more than his future income estimates,
particularly when allowing him more would require setting aside an otherwise

valid contract between husband and wife.
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never form an expectation of seizing any of the non-debtor
spouse's community property.2 3'
To the extent such
expectations can be properly formed, though, they are more
appropriately formed by the creditor that lends to a married
spouse involved in an ongoing community property regime.
Given the proliferation of divorce nowadays, creditor reliance
on marital status as a continuing one may be unreasonable.
But at least the non-debtor spouse here is identified-indeed,
she exists, and has already formed a relationship with the
debtor-and her income could conceivably be considered in
the decision of whether to extend credit, albeit to the debtor
spouse alone. When the married debtor spouse later enters
into a separation of property agreement, his creditors
arguably deserve some protection, as their reasonable
expectations may not be honored by holding them to the
separation of property agreement "made in the face of [the]
232
existing debt."
But granting an existing creditor the necessary relief
does not require a resort to any sort of complete nonapplication of marital agreements, recordation rule, or
mutual observance requirement that the community property
states have developed. The problem is capably handled by
principles of fraudulent transfer. Indeed, such concepts, as
"the main source of protection for unsecured creditors whose
debtors improperly transfer property . . . , are particularly
appropriate for transfers between spouses, where the transfer
is viewed with some suspicion."233
Applying the community
property states' basic
fraudulent transfer principles would allow a creditor to reach
property transferred "with intent to defraud," as well as any
property transferred by an insolvent debtor.2 34 A narrowlytailored rule like this more appropriately balances the rights
of the spouses to make meaningful adjustments to their own
marital property regime (and to enforce that agreement
231. Moreover, even as to the debtor spouse's property, the creditor has no
interest in any particularized item. He may expect to be able to seize, for
instance, his debtor's wages, but he does not know what those wages will be and
the debtor may do plenty to reduce that which is available. See Henderson,
supra note 139, at 204.
232.

1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES

§320, at 559 (rev. ed. 1940).
233. Henderson, supra note 139, at 186.
234. Id.; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-913 (2003).
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against third parties) with the rights of creditors that arose
before that agreement than does a broad rejection or
recordation rule.2 35
Admittedly, fraudulent conveyance principles will not
often apply to allow future creditors of the spouses to ignore a
matrimonial agreement made before the debt was incurred.
Absent some right in the creditor existing before the
fraudulent transfer, there is no basis on which to set aside the
agreement.23 6 Fraudulent transfer principles typically only
apply to allow existing creditors relief.237 This result just
demonstrates the beauty of the solution in this context.
Future creditors deserve no protection from a marital
agreement that existed before the obligation was ever
incurred. As will be demonstrated in the next section,
applying the fraudulent transfer principles in this context as
well-to refuse a future creditor the right to set aside his
debtor's existing marital agreement-more properly allocates
the burden between the creditor and the spouses.
D. InappropriatelyPlacingthe Burden
As applied to future creditors of the spouses, the various
rules on marital agreement enforceability, in effect, place the
burden on spouses to act to make their otherwise valid
agreement effective against third-party creditors.
For
example, the spouses must record their agreement in
Louisiana,"' or give all of their prospective creditors actual
notice of it in Wisconsin.23 9 In Nevada, the spouses are
utterly incapable of making a separation of property

235. Some courts have suggested that fraudulent transfer or conveyance
provisions are inadequate remedies for the spouses' creditors because the most
common type of marital agreement is the separation of property agreement,
which arguably does not amount to a "transfer." See, e.g., Pietri v. Pietri (In re
Pietri), 59 B.R. 68, 70-71 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986). Arizona, at least, has
expressly rejected such a narrow interpretation of the term "transfer" and has
allowed an existing creditor to use the state's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
as a shield to a marital agreement that purported only to change the "character
of [the spouses'] future earnings." State v. Wright, 43 P.3d 203, 205 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002).
236. See, e.g., Douglas J. Whaley, The Dangerous Doctrine of Moore v. Bay,
82 TEX. L. REV. 73, 85, 118 n.195 (2003).

237. Id.
238. See supra Part II.D.3.a.
239. See supra Part II.D.2.
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agreement that binds their creditors.24 ° These rules are,
indeed, creditor-friendly, and, again, I submit, too creditorfriendly in light of the alternatives.
Future creditors of the spouses, at least their voluntary
or contractual creditors, have an extraordinary ability to selfprotect that weighs against giving them additional special
protection.24 1
Most simply, the creditor can develop
appropriate expectations as to what property may be
available to satisfy the debt of his prospective married debtor
by asking! Certainly, creditors can bear the simple burden of
"inquir[ing] as to agreements between the spouses and the
status of their property." 24 2 Such a question could protect the
creditor quite nicely if accompanied by a rule estopping
spouses who claim "they have not and will not contract out of
the community property system" from "later claim[ing]
otherwise."2 43 Such questions may seem silly for informal
transactions involving movable goods or services, for example,
but, no matter the type of transaction, if the creditor chooses
not to ask, he should be bound by the agreement between the
spouses, and, as he would be in any non-community property
state, allowed to recover only from his debtor's property. 24
Further, a creditor desiring additional protection may require
security for the debt, thus binding a particular piece of
property to guarantee repayment, or even better, demand the
signature of both spouses, making the property of either
seizable.2 45
Because today's community property regime is one from
which spouses are given the right to opt out 246 and spouses
make widespread use of all manner of matrimonial
agreements to do just that, no creditor should be able to
240. See supra Part II.D.1.
241. Christine Davis, Note, 'Til Debt Do Us Part: Premarital Contracting
Around Community Property Law-An Evaluation of Schlaefer v. Financial
Management Service, Inc., 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1051, 1056 (2000).
242. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208.

243. Id.
244. See Newman, supra note 15, at 526 n.177.
245. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208.
Federal law imposes some
restrictions on a creditor's ability to demand the signatures of both spouses. For
a comprehensive discussion of these limitations, see Todd M. Johnson,
Limitations on Creditors' Rights to Require Spouses' Signatures Under the
ECOA and Washington Community Property Law, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
333 (1981).
246. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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seriously contend that he was unaware that the spouses may
24 7
have modified the community principles governing debt.
Thus, "[t]he issue comes down to a policy question: Who
should have the burden to protect his interests?"2 4 Must the
spouses explain their deviation from the community property
regime to a prospective creditor, "or should the creditor have
to protect himself by inquiring as to the state of the spouses'
property rights?"2 49 Placing the burden on a creditor to
overcome the argument that the spouses' separation of
property agreement binds him more logically and
appropriately balances the parties' rights. In view of the level
of sophistication and already "significant protection [given
creditors] under [state] community property doctrine"2 50 and
the creditors' "opportunity to self-protect [by inquiring as to
the spouses' status or requiring that both spouses incur the
debt] in the case of premarital agreements that abrogate
community property principles,"2 51 a set of special community
property rules governing creditor respect for separation of
property agreements is just too much.
Some argue that placing the burden of overcoming a
marital agreement on creditors is improper because tort
creditors cannot fairly bear it.
"Tort liability cannot be
planned in advance" and a future tort creditor of the spouses
cannot protect himself through negotiation.2 5 2 Moreover, such
a scheme has been criticized as a costly one that would
"increase[] the price to all customers" of creditor products and
services...253 It has been said that "all spouses would have
to bear increased costs for the benefit of those who elect to
254
change the ownership of their property."
These arguments, however, overlook the fact that the
247. The Nevada creditor may be the sole exception, as he knows the spouses
may make no agreement that can affect his rights.
See supra text
accompanying notes 145-147.
248. Henderson, supra note 139, at 208; see also AUDREY WITKOwSKI, WIS.
GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, STUDY PAPER: AN
EXAMINATION OF DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAWS IN THREE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY STATES AND SOME INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MODEL

MARITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 1-2 (1977).

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Henderson, supra note 139, at 208.
Davis, supra note 242, at 1056.
Id.
Henderson, supra note 139, at 209.
Id.
Id.
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forty-one non-community property states have been operating
in this manner for centuries. Tort creditors in common law
states may not seize both spouses' wages for one's tortious
activity, despite the fact that those debts are unanticipated.255
A tort creditor deserves to be made whole from the property of
the party that injured him.25 6 That the tortfeasor later
marries a spouse with hefty earnings should not give the
victim an additional debtor to pursue.
Moreover, noncommunity property states certainly have not seen costs
skyrocket merely because creditors are limited to seizing
their debtors' property alone. There is no evidence to suggest
that goods and services are more expensive in these common
law states than they are in community property states.
In short, there is no economic justification for retaining
the
current
creditor-friendly
rules
regarding
the
enforceability of marital agreements. The burden the creditor
in a community property state would have to bear if the rules
involving enforcement of marital agreements were changed to
allow for broader applicability to creditors would be no
greater than the burden the creditor in a non-community
property state bears every day. In the absence of an economic
justification, and in light of the strong familial interest and
creation of the community property regime to protect rather
than to hinder the economic efforts of married couples,2 57 the
current rules overprotecting creditors with regard to their
avoidance of spousal agreements seem unjustified.
IV. CONCLUSION

The
modern
community
property
regime
is
extraordinarily creditor-friendly. Some modifications of the
general rules of creditor collection are necessary in the
community context to effectively balance the rights of the
spouses and their creditors. The problem of the potential "$2
bankruptcy," for example, necessitates holding some
community property for a spouse's premarital debts to avoid
sanctioning marriage as a means of debt avoidance. But

255. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 4, at 478; Newman, supra note 15, at 526
n.177.
256. Joseph H. King, Jr., Painand Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the
Goals of Tort Law, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 163, 205 (2004).
257. See Riley, supra note 201.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 47

providing full community property liability is unnecessary
and unfair. The future earnings of the non-debtor spouse
should not be held under any theory, and particularly where
Likewise, full
they are unanticipated by the creditor.
community property liability for debts incurred during
marriage is inappropriate. A creditor lending to a married
person in a community property state gets the undeserved
perk of an additional party's assets without bearing any
responsibility for making that party a debtor. Such results
would never obtain in a common law jurisdiction, where a
creditor, absent agency or some other exceptional theory, has
rights to his debtor's property alone. Yet the spouses are
often not free in community property states to adopt the rules
of debt collection that would apply in those forty-one states
without meeting exceptionally onerous requirements.
The community regime's deviation from the common law
scheme of marital property in this regard is unwarranted and
Nothing inherent in viewing spouses as
unnecessary.
contributing, among themselves, to a sort of partnershipand sharing equally in that partnership during marriage and
beyond-necessitates a substantially divergent regime from
that obtaining in the common law with respect to third-party
relations with the spouses. Indeed, community property
jurisdictions, while retaining their innovations in the area of
family support and protection, would do well to borrow
appropriate rules of debt collection from common law states.
In so doing, the community property regime may have a
greater hope of maintaining its attractiveness to married
couples for the centuries to come.

